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I ARTICLES I

Standards, Rules and the Decline of the
Courts in the Law of Taxation
James W. Colliton*
I. Introduction
The tax law is the most complex body of statutory law that exists in
our legal system. This Article discusses the development of this law
from a simple 16 page statute in 1913 to the massive Internal Revenue
Code of today. Three related processes have shaped the current law.
First is the progression of the tax law from one governed by broad
standards to a law dominated by specific rules.' Second, the tax statute
has inexorably become more complex as Congress replaced the broad

*Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. I would like to thank Harold Krent and
Mark Weber for thoughtful comments on drafts of this Article.
1. There is a substantial body of scholarship that deals with the roles of standards and rules
in law. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: an Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983);
Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257 (1974); KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); P.S.
ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW:
A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTONS (1987);
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-31 (1961); HENRY M. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 155-58 (tent ed. 1958);
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); RICHARD POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-53 (1990); ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115-23 (1922); FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
A
PHILosOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991);
ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 88-100 (1975); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model

of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 22-29 (1967); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchyof Sources andForms
in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475, 482-87 (1933).
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standards with statutory rules. Finally, the evolution of the tax law into
a complex set of statutory rules has changed the relationship between the
judicial and legislative branches, causing a steady shift of power away
from the courts to Congress.
The first modem tax law, enacted in 1913, was brief and spoke in
general terms.2 The general nature of the early tax statute forced the
courts to create judicial principles to deal with problems, such as grantor
trusts, that were not controlled by specific statutory provisions. Congress
soon realized that frequent amendments of the tax law were necessary.
Most of the tax law has evolved predictably through the process of
enactment, confusion, litigation and enactment of ever more complex
amendments. The process begins when Congress enacts a broadly
worded statute, for taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service and the courts
to apply. As controversies develop, the I.R.S. and the courts interpret the
statutory standard in ways that cause Congress to amend the statute by
providing more detailed rules.3 As the I.R.S. and the courts interpret
these new rules, controversies again develop which inspire Congress to
provide yet more detailed rules.4 This process has been repeated
hundreds of times in the history of the tax law and is responsible for
most of its statutory complexity.5

2. Although the first modem tax statute was relatively simple, this does not mean that the tax
law was simple. It simply means that the statute did not provide answers to complex questions. The
effect of the uncomplicated first statute was to leave almost all decisions to the courts. See infra note
42 and accompanying text for an example of the broadness of the first tax law in the context of
taxation of trust income.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part III.
5. The subject of tax law complexity has been the subject of extensive scholarly discussion.
In addition, congressional staffs have studied the issue of simplification. See STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., WRITTEN PROPOSALS ON TAX
SIMPLIFICATION (Comm. Print 1990); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95TH CONG., IST
SESS., PUBLISHED ISSUES IN SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAX (Comm. Print 1977). See
generally, JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OFTHE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 196-98,
370 (1985); Rob Bennett, Complexity Happens, 45 TAx NOTES 781 (1989); Boris Bittker, Tar
Reform and Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1974); Walter J. Blum, Simplification of the
Federal Income Tax La.v, 10 TAX L. REV. 239 (1954); Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney,
Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tar Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891
(1987) (reviewing JEFFREY A. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCci GuLCIE
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987) [hereinafter GUCCI
GULCH]; Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tav Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 958 (1987) [hereinafter Tax Reforn]; Robert B.
Eichholz, Should the FederalTax Be Simplified?, 48 YALE L.J. 1200 (1939); Susan B. Long &
Judith A. Swingen, An Approach to the Measurement of Tax Law Complexity, J. AM. TAX ASS'N,
at 22 (1987); Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grailof Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267;
Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Icome Tax Simplification: The Political Process,34 TAX L. REV. 27,
27-28 (1978); John A. Miller, Indeterminacy- Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule

THE LAW OF TAXATION

The shift from a simple statute composed of broad standards to a
complex set of rules has reduced the power of the courts and the
Treasury over the tax law. Congress has chosen to answer almost all tax
policy questions itself, deciding what is reasonable, fair, politically
necessary or dictated by changed circumstances. The Treasury and the
courts are left to apply the narrow statutory provisions and to make the
lesser policy decisions required to implement the rules. Part II of this
Article describes this process of statutory tax law development. Part III
illustrates the process of statutory tax law development by describing the
history of grantor trust taxation.6 Part IV examines the implications of
the history of grantor trust taxation on the development of tax law. Part
V offers common law tax doctrine based on broad standards as a
comparative approach to the statutory evolution model. Part VI discusses
the forces and circumstances that form the tax law.
II. The Process of Tax Law Development
A. The Cycles of Tax Law Development
Typically, whenever there is confusion in judicial or administrative
interpretation of tax law, Congress amends the Internal Revenue Code,
cutting short development of a judicial consensus. Frequently, the courts
and the I.R.S. have set off on a path that, had it been allowed to
continue, would have resulted in workable and accepted ways of handling
issues. However, Congress' resolution of the controversies by amending
the statute stops the judicial and administrative development of the law.'

Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1993); Randolph E. Paul, Simplification
of Federal Tax Laws, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 285 (1944); Sidney I. Roberts, Simplification Symposium
Overview: The Viewpoint of the Tax Lawyer, 34 TAX L REV. 5 (1978); Sidney I. Roberts, et al., A
Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325 (1972); Deborah Schenk,
Simplificationfor IndividualTaxpayers: Problems and Proposals,45 TAX L. REX'. 121 (1989); Joel
Slemrod, The Return to Tax Simplification: An Econometric Analysis, 17 PUB. FIN. Q. 3, 34 (1989);
Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of
Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673 (1969); Stanley S. Surrey & Gerard M. Brannon,
Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax Policy, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 915 (1968); Michelle J.
White, Why are Taxes so Complex and Who Benefits?, 47 TAX NOTES 341 (1990).
6. The grantor trust rules provide that trust income is taxed to the grantor if the grantor has
retained too much control over the trust assets. I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1986). If the grantor trust rules
do not apply, trust income is taxed either to the beneficiaries, I.R.C. § 61(a)(15) (1986), or to the
trust itself. I.R.C. § 641 (1986).
7. The estate tax law dealing with estate freezes provides an example of this process. Congress
first enacted I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1986) in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-203, § 10402(a), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-431. It amended this section the next year in the
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3031, 102 Stat. 3342,
3634. This amendment made the provision longer and more complex. The Internal Revenue Service
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When Congress amends the law, it usually provides rigid, clear rules
to allow taxpayers and the I.R.S. to determine with certainty the tax
consequences of particular facts. It tries to anticipate and resolve future
interpretative problems.' The amendments Congress adopts and the
regulations the Treasury promulgates are invariably complex. In order
to avoid confusion, Congress must define the rules and exceptions with
precision and detail. Precise rules require long and complex statutes.
The result is a detailed and complex statute backed up by even more
detailed and complex regulations. 9 Broad standards have been replaced
with narrow, precise and complex statutory rules. Instead of case by case
judicial development of the standards using "facts and circumstances"
analysis, there are "bright line" rules. Instead of standards using concepts
such as reasonableness and substantiality, the statutes use formulas, fixed
percentages, fixed dollar amounts and specific time limits.
These clear and definite rules sharply curtail the flexibility and
power of the courts. To be sure, the courts must interpret the terms of
the new statute. However,- after Congress codifies the rules, the courts

provided guidance on the interpretation of § 2036(c) in I.R.S. Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422, a
document that was much more complex than the statute. Finally, Congress repealed § 2036(c) in the
Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11601, 104 Stat. 1388, and
enacted I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (Supp. III 1991) in the Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11602, 104 Stat. 1388. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (Supp III 1991) replaced
§ 2036(c). The new provisions were more comprehensive and complex than the previous estate
freeze provisions. The estate freeze law went from a brief provision to a very complex and long
provision in only four years.
8. Most tax provisions are forward looking and are intended to provide answers for foreseeable
circumstances. Most tax provisions, therefore, are given their meaning ex ante rather than expost.
Rules operate ex ante, while standards operate ex post. See Kaplow, supra note 1.
Sometimes Congress enacts a more general statute and directs the Treasury to fill in the gaps
through regulations. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 63(e)(3) (1986) (implicitly directing the Secretary to prescribe
regulations concerning a change in election to itemize deductions), I.R.C. § 168(d)(3)(A) (1986)
(providing exceptions in regulations concerning substantial property placed in service during lastthree
months of taxable year).
Congress has extended delegation to an extreme with respect to substantiation requirements
for charitable contributions. I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(E) directs the Secretary to prescribe "regulations that
may provide that some or all of the [substantiation] requirements . . . do not apply in appropriate
cases." I.R.C. § 170(O(8)(E) (Supp. V 1993). It is difficult to imagine a more complete delegation
of legislative power.
The effect of such provisions is that Congress delegates to the Treasury the responsibility of
promulgating rules and standards. In practice, the Treasury generally provides precise rules rather
than standards in response to this sort of legislation.
9. A recent example is I.R.C. § 469 (1986). This section provides rules limiting deductions
for passive losses and consists of eight dense pages of text. Id. Section 469 is expanded by eightyseven pages of temporary regulations. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469 (1989). See Miller, supra note
5, at 17-20.
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are no longer free to develop new basic doctrines. They are limited to
fact finding and interpretation of narrow statutory terms.
As this cycle continues, power shifts away from the courts to the
legislature. Congress does not seem to be intentionally taking power
from the courts. Rather, the decline of judicial power is a natural
consequence of Congress solving problems and satisfying its political
obligations with legislation.
The courts and the Treasury have not abdicated their responsibilities
as their roles change. The courts continue to decide cases according to
their best judgment under the statute with a view to structure and
development of the law. The Treasury continues to produce regulations,
rulings and litigation as it administers the law. Congress, the courts and
the I.R.S. continue to work in accordance with the accumulated
experience and wisdom of our system of government. Now, however,
legislation overshadows the courts and I.R.S.
While some of its decisions may be unwise, Congress is doing
nothing improper by enacting rules that reduce judicial power. The
Constitution gives Congress the authority to "lay and collect taxes on
incomes."'" This authority allows Congress to enact tax statutes in
whatever form it thinks best. Congress may enact forward looking rules
that try to provide specific answers to many questions." Alternatively,
it may enact general standards that require the judgment of the I.R.S. or
the courts to produce an answer.' 2 Throughout the history of the tax
law, Congress has consistently replaced general standards, whether
judicial or statutory, with detailed, precise rules. 3
The process of constant amendment to the tax law exists because
Congress does not view the Internal Revenue Code as permanent and
fixed. The history of the tax law shows that Congress sees it as a
flexible system, regularly changeable to resolve confusion and to

10. The Sixteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
taxes on incomes ....
11. For example, I.R.C. § 274 (1986) provides specific rules for business expense deductions,
which include such diverse activities as social clubs, I.R.C. § 274(a) (1986), gifts, I.R.C. § 274(b)
(1986). attendance at conventions in certain Caribbean countries I.R.C. § 274(h)(6) (1986), charitable
sports events, I.R.C. § 274(l)(1)(B) (1986), and luxury water transportation, I.R.C. § 274(m)(1)
(1986).
12. For example, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986) allowstax exemptions for"charitable" organizations
without defining "charitable."
13. Compare I.R.C. § 2032A (1986) (providing special estate tax valuation rules for farms and
other land-rich businesses) with I.R.C. § 2033 (1986) (providing the basic rule that property owned
at death is subject to the estate tax). Although short and easily read, § 2033 is the most important
provision in the estate tax. Section 2032A, in contrast, is a very narrow provision that applies to
only a few factual situations, but is much longer and much more complex.
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accomplish desirable goals. Congress changes the tax law whenever
necessary to respond to shifting social and political forces.
Tax legislation occurs in a super-charged political atmosphere. 4
As social goals change during political upheavals such as the outbreak of
war or the election of a new president, major tax changes often result.
Interest groups have important stakes in tax legislation and engage in
intensive lobbying. Political realities cause Congress to continually revise
the law, often in response to powerful forces inundating it with demands
for change backed by political threats and rewards.
Most of the tax law is produced by this process of repeated statutory
amendment. However, some of the tax law has developed through
judicial development of case law applying broadly worded statutory
standards. For the parts of the tax law that developed along this second
path, the statutory standard was stable and provided broad, flexible
principles that the courts applied to specific facts. Over time, this process
developed a body of common law based on the statutory standard.
Part IV of this Article considers those tax law doctrines that remain
dominated by broad standards, rather than specific rules. It relates the
history of the capital asset principles, one of the few tax areas that
remains dominated by standards. This section also attempts to explain
why some tax doctrines, such as those governing capital assets have not
become dominated by narrow statutory rules.
B. Scholarly Viewpoints
Scholars have explained the development of the law in a variety of
ways. Although these theories are often presented as the one true
explanation of what is really happening, the reality is that tax law
development is complex and responds to many influences. The various
theories are valuable because each explains part of the forces that
combine to form the tax law.
Professors Doemberg and McChesney provide an explanation for
what they perceive as an accelerating rate of tax reform. 5 According
to them, tax legislation is a contract whereby private interests compensate
legislators with money and other benefits in return for favorable

14. See BINBAUM & MURRAY, supranote 5; Daniel Shaviro, BeyondPublic Choice andPublic
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustratedby Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1990), Gucci GULCH supra note 5, Tax Reform, supra note 5.
15. Gucci GuLcH supra note 5, Tax Reform, supra note 5. Professors Doemberg and
McChesney rely on the data assembled in JOHN F. WrrIE, TIE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1985), in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 913-23.
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legislation. 6 Their analysis follows the approach of public choice or
economic theory of legislation. 7
Doemberg and McChesney believe that the rate of tax law change
is increasing and that tax law stability is decreasing because of a shift
from longer- to shorter- term contracts.' 8 They attribute this shift to
changes in the legislative structure and in the legislative process.
To the extent that Doemberg and McChesney demonstrate that
wealthy and powerful people and groups do well in the tax legislative
process, their conclusions are not surprising or novel. However, their
belief that deal-making for private purposes is the predominant
mechanism in tax legislation is questionable.' 9
Tax legislation is more complex than simple deal making. For one
thing, there are often hundreds of groups interested in a particular piece
of tax legislation. Their promises and threats tend to cancel each
other.2" The Doemberg-McChesney thesis also overlooks the possibility,
scorned particularly by public choice scholars, that some of the parties
involved in tax legislation may be acting, at least part of the time, in the
public interest.2'

16.
17.

Tal Reform, supra note 5, at 914.
In support of their analysis, they cite Jean-Luc Migu6, Controls Versus Subsidies in the

Economic Theory of Regulation, 20 J. L. & ECON. 213 (1977), George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Econonic Regulations, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT So. 3 (1971); Robert E. McCormick, The

Strategic Use of Regulations: A Review of the Literature, in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, LAW
AND EcoNomcs CONFERENCE, THE POLrTCAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN

THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1984).
Other scholars criticize public choice analysis. See e.g., Shaviro, supranote 14; Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CtI. L. REv. 63 (1990);
Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture,and Ideology in the Economic Theory ofPolitics,74 AM.
ECON. REv. 279 (1984); Mark Kelman, OnDemocracyBashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical
and "Enipirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L REV.'. 199 (1988).
18. Tat Reform, supra note 5, at 914. My colleague Mark Weber explains that, "while it is
possible to buy politicians, they don't stay bought."
19. Other scholars have criticized their public choice analysis. See, e.g., Shaviro, supranote
12;Edward A. Zelinsky, JamesMadison andPublic Choice at Gucci Gulch: A ProceduralDefense
of Tar Evpenditures and Tax Institutions, 1993 YALE L.J. 1165, 1180-82 (1993).
20. I am reminded of the story of the Nevada judge who was trying a mining claim case. One
day he received an envelope containing $20,000 from the plaintiff's lawyer. The next day he
received an envelope containing $10,000 from the defendant's lawyer. The judge called both lawyers
into his chambers; handed $10,000 to the plaintiffs lawyer and declared: "Gentlemen, this case will
be decided on its merits."
21. Many scholars assume that only they really understand the shenanigans of the rascally
legislators and lobbyists. Without seeming to be too much of a Pollyanna, I suggest that professors
are not the only honest people interested in the public good. There are at least a few honest and
capable people who are not professors.
Judge Abner Mikva, who has had long experience as a legislator and federal judge, rejects the
views of public choice scholars:
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Daniel Shaviro criticizes public choice theory generally through an
examination of tax legislation in the 1980's.22 He notes that many more
forces act on the legislative process than the narrow economic goals that
are the center of public choice theory2" and demonstrates that the desire
for power, prestige and symbolic action all influence the process.24
Some public choice theorists have focused attention on the
delegation of authority to regulatory agencies. They believe that the
nature of agencies provides incentives for legislatures to delegate rulemaking authority to agencies.2"

Professors Aranson, Gellhom and

Robinson conclude that Congressional delegation is a means by which
Congress provides private goods to interest groups.26 Delegation,
according to this theory allows legislators to create private goods while
shifting responsibility to the agency. Delegation allows legislators to
shift credit and blame to the agency, a circumstance that benefits them
when they can shift blame while keeping the credit.2"
Aranson,
Gellhorn and Robinson also speculate that delegation is the equivalent of
creating a public policy lottery that both legislators and their interest
group clients may prefer to certainty.29 According to them "[t]he
delegation of legislative authority to agencies, which facilitates the
regulatory production of private benefits . . . has been a growing
problem."30 They suggest renewal of the constitutional nondelegation
doctrine to combat this problem."
The politicians and other people I have known in public life just do not fit the "rentseeking" egoist model that the public choice theorists offer. Perhaps I am still one of the
naive citizens who believe that politics is on the square, that majorities in effect make
policy in this country, and that out of the clash of partisan debate and frequent elections
"good" public policy decisions emerge. Not even my five terms in the Illinois state
legislature - that last vestige of democracy in the "raw" - nor my five terms in the
United States Congress, prepared me for the villains of the public choice literature.
Abner Mikva, Forewordto Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice,74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
22. See Shaviro, supranote 14.
23. Id. at 96.
24. Id.at 76-96. Additionally, Shaviro shows that the media plays an important role in
legislation, id.at 96-98, as do ideas and ideology. Id. at 98-100.
25. See MoRRIs P. FioRiNA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(1977).
26. Peter H. Aranson, et al., A Theory ofLegislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982).
27. Id. at 56.
28. Id. at 56-7.
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id. at 63.
31. Aranson, et a., supranote 26, at 63. They suggest that "[aipplication of the [nondelegation]
doctrine would force Congress to legislate in greater detail." Id. They seem to think that this is
desirable.
The mere thought of Congress legislating tax law in greater detail is enough to make tax
lawyers start considering early retirement. Whatever else we need in the tax law, we do not need
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This Article demonstrates that delegation is not a problem, growing
or otherwise, in tax law. Members of Congress have consistently chosen
not to delegate basic decisions to the I.R.S. or to the courts. Rather,
Congress has consistently chosen to legislate answers. 2 Whatever the
benefits of delegation to legislators and interest groups in other areas of
the law, Congress has clearly chosen not to delegate legislative power in
the tax law in order to facilitate deals.33 Congress is willing to accept
both the credit and blame for tax legislation.
Looking at legal development from a different viewpoint, Louis
Kaplow provides an economic explanation for why rules or standards are
selected in the law generally. 4 His analysis is useful in explaining the
shift in the tax law away from statutory and judicial standards to complex
statutory rules. He points out that "the greater the frequency with which
a legal command will apply, the more desirable rules tend to be relative
to standards"3 5 and that rules are less costly to enforce when the relevant
behavior is frequent.36 In addition, Kaplow notes that standards are
preferable when the law covers widely varying factual situations.37 This
analysis helps explain why standards still define parts of the tax law.38

greater detail.
32. Public choice theorists presumably would explain the lack of delegation in the tax law as
the result of legislators' desire to retain authority in this area to increase their chances of re-election.
In tax law, the explanation would be that the benefits of taking credit for creation of private tax
goods outweigh the detriment of taking the blame. This explanation is certainly true in many cases,
but it is obvious.
33. Congress frequently directs the I.RS. to fill out the details of legislation with regulations.
Generally Congress delegates the details to the Treasury after making the major policy and political
decisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 409(h)(4) (1986) (permitting the Secretary to regulate put options in
the context of tax credit for employee stock ownership plans); I.R.C. § 1247ab)(2)(B) (1986)
(indicating that the Secretary has prescribed regulation of distributions after the end of the taxable
year which pertain to the election by foreign investment companies to distribute income currently).
Congress decides who wins and who loses and takes the credit and blame for itself. A
computer search shows 1340 places in the Internal Revenue Code where the Treasury is directed to
promulgate regulations. Although most delegations involve minor decisions, Congress sometimes
delegates major decision to the Treasury. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 469(1) (1986) (directing the Secretary
to prescribe regulations for passive loss rules).
I.R.C. § 170(t)(8)(E) (Supp. V 1993), dealing with substantiation of charitable contributions,
provides the surprising directive that the "Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph, including regulations that may
provide that some or all of the requirements of this paragraph do not apply in appropriate cases."
Id. It is difficult to imagine a broader delegation of legislative power than this. It is also difficult
to defend this provision under even the narrowest reading of the delegation doctrine.
34. Kaplow, supra note 1.
35. Id.at 577.
36. Id. at 581.
37. Id. at 582.
38. See e.g., I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986) (allowing deductions for the expenses of carrying on a trade
or "business"); I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (1986) (defining one form of charitable contribution as
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III. A History of Grantor Trust Taxation
A. Overview of the Development of Grantor Trust Taxation
The history of grantor trust taxation illustrates the development of
the statutory tax law through repeated amendment. In its 80 year history,
this part of the law has gone from having no directly applicable statute
to a set of detailed statutory rules. The history of grantor trust taxation
shows the operation of the three inter-related processes that are the focus
of this Article. First, it shows the steady shift from broad statutory and
judicial standards to statutory rules. Second, it illustrates the inexorable
development of statutory complexity in the tax law. Finally, the history
of grantor trust taxation demonstrates the dramatically changing roles of
the courts and Congress.
The Code generally treats trusts as distinct taxpaying entities and
taxes trust income in the same manner as individual income.39
However, when trust income is distributed to beneficiaries, the value of
the distributions can be deducted, 40 and the beneficiary must pay tax on
The trust, therefore, pays tax on
the trust income received.4
undistributed income and the beneficiary pays tax on distributed income.
Traditionally taxpayers have used trusts to shift the income tax
burden to family members in lower income tax brackets. They create
trusts naming others as beneficiaries, but do not give up control of the
trust assets. By creating trusts without surrendering control, grantors try
to shift taxable income to lower income tax bracket family members
without actually relinquishing the trust property or its income.
In response, the I.R.S. and Congress have created the grantor trust
rules to prevent this shifting of income. The grantor trust rules in effect
treat the grantor as the real owner of the trust assets.
The development of these rules follows the pattem outlined in Part
I of this Article. First came a broadly stated statutory standard. Then
interpretive problems required the courts and the Treasury to interpret the
Because these judicial and
law through rulings and regulations.
administrative holdings were often conflicting, Congress added rules to
clarify and define the law. This cycle of a statutory standard causing
interpretive confusion and subsequent amendment has been repeated
many times and has led to the present detailed grantor trust rules.
contributions to
array of forms,
39. I.R.C.
40. I.R.C.
41. I.R.C.

"religious" and "charitable" organizations). Businesses and charities may take a vast
making it difficult for Congress to specify rules for each charity or business.
§ 641(b) (1986).
§ 661(a)(1) (1986).
§ 61(aXl5) (1986).

THE LAW OF TAXATION

The modem income tax law came into existence when Congress
enacted the Income Tax Law of 1913,42 shortly after the, ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment4 3 authorizing federal income taxation. The
Income Tax Law of 1913 had no specific provisions for the taxation of
trust income. It only had a general provision that taxed income and did
not specify whether the trustee, the beneficiary or the grantor should pay
tax on trust income. 44 Although the Income Tax Law of 1913 had no
rules about trust income tax, this gap in the tax law did not immediately
provoke litigation.45
42. Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-181 (1913).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth amendment states, "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
A constitutional amendment was necessary because Article 1, section 9 of the Constitution
requires that "direct" taxes be apportioned among the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Supreme
Court had previously held the 1894 income tax unconstitutional as a direct tax. Pollock v. Farmers*
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), rehg granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), overruled by, South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), reh'g denied, 486 U.S. 1062 (1988). The Sixteenth
amendment was proposed and ratified to allow an income tax.
A federal income tax was first proposed during the War of 1812 to pay for war costs, but was
not enacted. An income tax was enacted during the Civil War and existed from 1862 until 1872,
when it was repealed. An income tax reappeared in 1893 and existed until the Supreme Court held
it unconstitutional in 1895 in Pollock, supra.
A more complete description of the early attempts at a national income tax is contained in
WIT, supra note 5. See also SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA chap. 5
(1967); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4-29 (1954); ROY G. BLAKEY &
GLADYS BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 2-8 (1940); EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME
TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND
ABROAD 439-81 (1911); DAvis R. DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF TIE UNITED STATES 262-330

(1934); Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q. J. OF ECON. 416 (1894).
44. Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, section IIA, subdivision 1, 38 Stat. 114, 166-181 (1913). This
section is the predecessor of current I.R.C. § 1 (1986), imposing the tax. Section IIB of the Act, the
predecessor of current I.R.C. § 61 (1986), states:
IThe net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from
salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and in whatever
form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or
dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or
interest in real or personal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the
transaction of any lawful business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and
income derived from any source whatever, including the income from but not the value
of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent ....
Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, section IIB, subdivision 1, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913).
45. There were no reported cases involving trust income from 1913 to 1918. See Notes on the
Revenue Act of 1918: Digest of Decisions of the United States Courts Construing the Internal
Revenue Laws of 1909 to 1918, Inclusive (1919).
Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925), the only significant case litigated under the 1913 law,
shows that the law left important questions unanswered. This case dealt with whether the income
from a trust created by gift or transfer at death was taxable to the beneficiary. The income could be
taxed to the beneficiary under the general language taxing all income under section IIA, subdivision
1,of the Act. Alternatively, it could be an excludible transfer "by gift, bequest, devise or descent'
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It is tempting to look at the first income tax statute and conclude
that the law was simple since the statutory rules were short and easy to
read. This view is misleading. Although the statute appeared simple, it
produced complexity because the statute did not provide clear answers in
many situations. John Miller has defined this type of complexity as
"judgmental complexity."46 Trusts, grantors and beneficiaries existed in
1913 despite the silence of the statute on trust taxation..
Mastery of the provisions contained in the first income tax law was
not difficult. However, application of the tax law's bare provisions could
not produce reliable answers. The early law provided only the vague
principle that income should be taxed, but gave little guidance about
application of this standard to the vast array of trust structures that could
be invented by creative lawyers. After consulting the first tax statute, and
considering its basic purposes, a lawyer could only guess at the
probability that income from a particular trust would be taxed and to
whom. The statute was simple; the law was not.
In contrast, there are now detailed statutory grantor trust
provisions.47 The current statute is complex, but, if accurately applied,
will usually produce predictable, consistent results.4" Miller calls this
sort of complexity "elaborative complexity."4 9 The tax law concerning
grantor trusts has always been complex. However, the nature of the
complexity has changed from judgmental complexity to elaborative
complexity. The elaborative complexity of the present tax law requires

under section IIB of the Act Id. The Court held that trust income was taxable to the beneficiary
and was not an excludible gift or death transfer. Id. at 168.
The Supreme Court decision in Gavit was handed down after Congress had amended the law
to resolve the issue for future cases. It is interesting that this case was argued on April 15, 1925, and
decided on April 27, 1925. Such a speedy decision would be unheard of today.
46. See Miller, supra note 5, at 12.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 167-197.
48. An underlying assumption of this article is that application of tax rules usually provides
results in a relatively mechanical and predictable manner. In my opinion, the tax rules produce clear
answers most of the time. See generally, Miller, supra note 5.
However, the question of whether law in general is determinate or indeterminate has been the
subject of considerable academic debate. See Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw.
U. L. REV. 148 (1990) (arguing that law is completely indeterminate); Kent Greenawalt, How Law
Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that legal questions often have determinate
answers); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989) (defending the claim that
legal indeterminacy is no more than moderate); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988) (positing that determinate rule systems are possible); KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND
OBJECTIVITY (1992); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIoN-MAKING INLAW AND INLIFE (1991).
Miller discusses these scholars' ideas about determinacy in the context of tax law. Miller,
supra note 5.
49. Miller, supra note 5.
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great effort in deciphering the statute." However, once the statute is
understood in its historical context, it usually produces a clear answer.5
B. 1913 to 1923
The first income tax law survived only three years. Congress
revised it in 1916 in order to produce revenue for World War .52
Congress used this occasion to clarify the taxation of trust income. In
addition to raising the tax rates, the Revenue Act of 1916"3 contained a
provision dealing with taxation of trust income,54 the first step in a long
series of amendments. Since that time, Congress has amended the law
repeatedly. 5

50. Everyone familiar with the Internal Revenue Code has a favorite incomprehensible
provision. My favorite is the sentence: "For purposes of paragraph (3), an organization described
in paragraph (2) shall be deemed to include an organization described in section 501(c)(4), (5), or
(6) which would be described in paragraph (2) if it were an organization described in section
501(c)(3)." I.R.C. § 509(a) (1986).
I have, on several occasions and with great effort, figured out what this sentence means.
However, I promptly forgot my answer, forcing me to repeat the agonizing process the next time I
needed to know.
5 i. The fact that the statute is intricate does not necessarily mean that the law is excessively
complex. With respect to grantor trusts, Boris Bittker has noted:
Sections 671-675 .. .are intricate provisions. As compared with the pre-1946 law
governing income-splitting trusts, however, their message is crystal-clear. The statutory
language was simpler in earlier years, but the taxpayer and his advisor had to weigh the
implications of hundreds of judicial decisions, most of which simply announced that all
of the relevant facts and circumstances were to be weighed in determining whether the
income of a trust was taxable to the grantor or to its trustee and beneficiaries.
Bittker, supra note 5.
52. See ADDITIONAL REVENUE, ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Sept. 4,
1914. H.R. Doc. NO. 1157, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). The legislative history of the Revenue Act
of 1916 states that "[tlhe necessity of this legislation grows out of the extraordinary increase in the
appropriations for the Army and Navy and the fortification of our country." H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
53. Pub. L. No. 271, ch. 463, 39 Stat 756.
54. Section 2(b) of the Revenue Act of 1916 provides:
Income received by estates of deceased persons during the period of administration or
settlement of the estate, shall be subject to the normal and additional tax and taxed to their
estates, and also such income of estates or any kind of property held in trust, including
such income accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn or unascertained persons, or
persons with contingent interests, and income held for future distribution under the terms
of the will or trust shall be likewise taxed, the tax in each instance, except when the
income is returned for the purpose of the tax by the beneficiary, to be assessed to the
executor, administrator, or trustee, as the case may be ....
Id. at 757-58. Congress apparently did not think that the provisions dealing with trust taxation were
very important because there is no mention of them in the legislative history of the Revenue Act of
1916. See H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916); S.REP. No. 793, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1 (1916); H.R. REP. No. 1200, 64th Cong. 1st Sess. (1916).
55. Congress again amended the tax law in 1917 to finance increased military spending. Act
of March 3, 1917, Pub. L. No. 377, ch. 159, 39 Stat. 1000. The 1917 amendment did not deal with
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Congress further clarified the taxation of trust income with § 219 of
the Revenue Act of 1918,56 a provision which gave the taxation of trust
income its current form. Essentially, this provision provided for taxation
of a trust on its undistributed income, and of beneficiaries on distributed
income. 5 The Revenue Act of 1921"8 amended and reworded § 219.
The legislative history5 9 of this Act states that "[slection 219 is amended

trust taxation. Id.
56. Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919). Section 219 of this act provided generally
that a trust was taxable on its income, but that a deduction is allowed for amounts distributed to
beneficiaries. Id. § 219. The beneficiaries were required to include the amount that the trust
distributed to them in their income. Section 219(a) of this act provided:
That the tax imposed .. shall apply to the income ... of any kind of property held in
trust, including (2) Income accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn or unascertained persons or
persons with contingent interests;
(3) Income held for future distribution under the terms of the will or trust; and
(4) Income which is to be distributed to the beneficiaries periodically, whether or not at
regular intervals, and the income collected by a guardian of an infant to be held or
distributed as the court may direct.
Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 219(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1071 (1919).
Section 219(c) provided generally that the tax was imposed on the net income of the trust and
that the fiduciary was to pay the tax.
Section 219(d) provided an exception to the general rule that the fiduciary was to pay the tax
on trust income:
In cases under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) [concerning income to be distributed to
beneficiaries periodically], . . .the tax shall not be paid by the fiduciary, but there shall
be included in computing the net income of each beneficiary his distributive share,
whether distributed or not, of the net income of the ... trust for the taxable year ....
Id. § 219(d).
57. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 98, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
59. 1 have relied heavily on legislative histories in this Article. Justice Scalia does not believe
that legislative history should be used in interpreting statutes. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d
1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources
inStatutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160.
160-75.
Some academic commentators have also expressed distrust of legislative history. See Frank
H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CI. L. REV. 533, 544-52 (1983); Kenneth W. Starr,
Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375-79.
I believe that legislative histories provide useful insight into the meaning of tax statutes. See
Michael A. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991). Other commentators support the use of
legislative history. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and other "Benign Fictions":
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative
History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 43-47; Abner Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987
DUKE L.J. 380, 385; Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 201 (1983).
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slightly for the purpose of clarifying its provisions and making the
interpretation thereof more definite and certain. '"60
When Congress first enacted the tax law in 1913 the taxation of trust
income had no specific statutory rules. By 1918 Congress had expanded
the tax statute to include a fairly comprehensive set of rules allocating the
tax burden between trustee and beneficiary. However, the statutory tax
law did not yet have provisions requiring the grantor to pay tax on trust
income. The 1918 tax law, although much less elaborate than current
law, had begun to exhibit the dense language and the multiple crossreferences that are the hallmark of today's law. It had started down the
path toward rules and statutory complexity.
Controversies over the interpretation of § 219 of the Revenue Act of
1918 led to litigation6' and to administrative pronouncements. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue initially took the position that "[t]he income
of a revocable trust must be included in the gross income of the
grantor.'6'2 In 1922, however, the Bureau reversed its position and ruled

60. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1921). Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Advisor to the
Treasury Department, testified regarding the 1921 trust taxation amendments that: "[t]he changes
in the law have been made merely in order to make the present practice more precise. There is no
change in the present regulations or practice." Hearings on H.R. 8245, An Act to Reduce and
Equalize Taxation, to Amend and Simplify the Revenue Act of 1918,andfor Other Purposes Before
the Committee onFinance, 67th Cong., Ist
Sess. 69 (1921). Cf Fleming v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A.
900 (1927) (reading section 219 as having identical requirements under the Revenue Acts of 1918
and 1921).
61. See, e.g., Baltzell v. Mitchell, 3 F.2d 428 (lst Cir. 1925), cert denied, 268 U.S. 690 (1925):
Scripps v. Commissioner, I B.T.A. 491 (1925), acq., V-I C.B. 2 (1925); Brown & Ives v.
Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 936 (1925); McConnell v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 260 (1926); Fleming
v.Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 900 (1927). These cases deal with allocating tax income and deductions
between the trust and the beneficiary. They did not consider whether the grantor should include the
income or take the deductions.
62. O.D. 621, 3 C.B. 202 (1920), revoked by I.T. 1589, lI-I C.B. 51 (1923). The Bureau of
Internal Revenue also ruled that:
Where a declaration of trust provides that during the life of the donor he may indicate the
manner in which the trustee shall exercise the powers conferred by the trust agreement;
that the donor shall have a voice in determining the amount of net income to be
distributed to the beneficiaries; and that the estate created and the interests vested
thereunder shall be subject to revocation by the donor at any time, in whole or in part,
it is held that the amount of income received by the beneficiaries is in the nature of a gift
and, that the trustee merely acts as agent for the donor. The income of the trust should
therefore be included in the gross income of the donor in accordance with article 341 of
Regulations 45.
11-1
C.B. 51 (1923).
These Office Decisions were consistent with the Treasury Regulations. The regulations relating
to the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917 provided: "A deed of trust must be absolute so far as the
conveyance of title is concerned and irrevocable by the donor, otherwise the income form the
property in question will accrue to the donor and must be accounted for by him." Treas. Reg. 33,
(Revised) art. 29,
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that the grantor of a revocable trust should only be taxed on trust income
that he received as a beneficiary of the trust.63 The grantor was not
taxed on the general trust income.'
A number of cases dealt with whether § 219 required the grantor of
the trust to include trust income and whether the grantor could use
deductions arising from the trust property. For example, the court in
Stoddard v. Eaton65 held that the grantor of a revocable trust with
income payable to the grantor could deduct the losses arising from the
trust property.66 In rejecting the government's position that the trust fell
within the rules of § 219, the court stated:
After all, the word "trust," as used in § 219 of the Revenue Act of
1918 (Comp. St. § 6336 1/8ii), can hardly have been intended to
comprehend every instance in which a trust is recognized in equity.
A trust ex maleficio, a resulting trust, or a constructive trust are
examples of trusts which do not fit into the frame of the statute. A
trust, as therein understood, is not only an express trust, but a genuine
trust transaction. A revenue statute does not address itself to
fictions.6"
Stoddard v. Eaton provided a standard for evaluating future cases.
A trust was viewed as a "genuine trust transaction" that is not a "fiction."
The courts in this and other cases were beginning to develop judicial
standards. However, as the rest of this section will show, Congress
preempted the judicial process by legislating statutory rules every time the
courts started to develop standards.
After Stoddard v. Eaton, the Treasury returned to its previously
abandoned position that sales profits should be included in the income of

The regulations under the Revenue Act of 1918 provided that: "Itihe income of a revocable
trust must be included in the gross income of the grantor." Treas. Reg. 45, art. 341.
63. L.O. 1102, 1-2 C.B. 50 (1922).
64. Id.
65. 22 F.2d 184 (D. Conn. 1927).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 186-187. Cf. Boynton v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1352 (1928) acq., VII-I C.B. 5
(1928); Chamberlain v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 126 (1930), nonacq., IX-2 C.B. 70 (1930);
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 132 (1931), acq., X-2 C.B. 14 (1931); Catlin v.
Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 834 (1932), acq., XI-2 C.B. 2 (1932). The dissent in Boynton contains
a thorough description of the history of the law in this area. Boynton, 11 B.T.A. at 1364-74 (Green,
J. dissenting).
Hoff v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 86 (1930), required the grantor of a revocable trust to
include the trust's income in her gross income. The Board of Tax Appeals read Corliss v. Bowers,
281 U.S. 376 (1930), as declaring this result to be the law, even in cases arising before the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1924. Hoff, 20 B.T.A. at 87. But see Steffanson v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A.
979 (1925) (denying loss deduction to trust grantor).
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the grantor.68 However, the district court in Warden v. Lederer,69
examined a revocable trust with income payable to the grantor and held
that capital gains were taxable to the trust rather than to the grantor.
In 1924, Congress again amended the trust taxation provisions,
enacting § 219(g) and (h) of the Revenue Act of 1924.70 These
provisions clarified the law and combated the use of trusts to shift income
to lower income beneficiaries. According to the legislative history of the
1924 Act, Congress viewed these trusts as devices to assign income.7
Section 219(g)" taxed grantors on the income of revocable trusts.
Section 219(h)73 taxed the income to the grantors of trusts if the grantor

68. See Warden v. Lederer, 24 F.2d 233 (E.D. Pa. 1927).
69. Id.
70. Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, §§ 219(g) and (h), 43 Stat. 253, 277. See Russell Magill, What
Shall Be Done with the Clifford Case?, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 111-14 (1944) (discussing the
history of these provisions).
71. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). The House Report indicates that Congress
changed the law to prevent avoidance of income tax and that: "Where the grantor of a trust retains
the power of revocation the income of the trust is to be taxed to him." Id. at 7. The Senate Report
states:
(2) Paragraph (g) of this section provides that where the grantor of a trust reserves
the right to change the trust in favor of himself the income is taxed to the grantor ....
The creation of a revocable trust constitutes nothing but an assignment of the right
to receive future income. Since such an assignment does not operate to increase the
taxable income of the assignor, the creation of a revocable trust should not so operate, but
the income of such a trust should be included in the income of the grantor. The bill so
provides.
(3) Subdivision (h) of this section provides that the income of a trust which may
be distributed to the grantor or which may be used for the payment of premiums upon
policies of insurance on his life shall be included in the gross income of the grantor.
Trusts have been used to evade taxes by means of provisions allowing the distribution of
the income to the grantor or its use for his benefit' The purpose of this subdivision of the
bill is to stop this evasion.
S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). See also STATEMENT OF THE CHANGES MADE IN THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1921 BY H. R. 6715 AND THE REASONS THEREFOR, 68TH CONG., IST. SESS.,
(Comm. Print 1924).
72. Section 219(g) stated:
(g) Where the grantor of a trust has, at any time during the taxable year, either alone or
in conjunction with any person not a beneficiary of the trust, the power to revest in
himself title to any part of the corpus of the trust, then the income of such part of the
trust for such taxable year shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor.
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, § 219(g), 43 Stat, 253, 257. See also Lewis v.
White, 56 F.2d 390 (D. Mass. 1932) (contains a discussion of the Congressional history of § 219(g)).
73. Section 219(h) stated:
Where any part of the income of a trust may, in the discretion of the grantor of the trust,
either alone or in conjunction with any person not a beneficiary of the trust, be distributed
to the grantor or be held or accumulated for future distribution to him, or where any part
of the income of the trust is or may be applied to the payment of premiums on policies
of insurance on the life of the grantor (except policies of insurance irrevocably payable
for the purposes and in the manner specified in paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of
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had discretion to distribute income to himself. The Supreme Court
eventually held these provisions to be constitutional. 4
The law of grantor trust taxation changed significantly between the
enactment of the Income Tax Law of 1913 and the Revenue Act of 1924.
Although none of the modifications was dramatic, the law was much
different by 1924. The most notable development was that the 1924 law
had comprehensive rules governing trust taxation, with specific provisions
taxing the grantor. The general provisions for taxing income had been
augmented by specific provisions governing trust taxation.
It is interesting to speculate what would have happened if Congress
had not been so willing to enact trust taxation provisions. Initially, the
75
Bureau of Internal Revenue vacillated on the taxation of grantor trusts.
Eventually, as problems of interpretation and abuses emerged, the
government would have settled on legal interpretations. The Bureau
would have published these interpretations in regulations and rulings.
Those taxpayers who wished to avoid controversy with the government
would have complied with the government interpretation, while others
would have litigated. In deciding the cases, the courts would have then
determined the law and provided doctrines that would have filled in the
gaps in the statute. At first the court decisions would probably have been
inconsistent and conflicting. Eventually, however, judicial standards, and
perhaps precise rules, would have developed. Had this process been
allowed to continue, the law would have become clear and stable.
Only part of this scenario actually occurred. Between 1913 and
1924, the Bureau of Internal Revenue developed its approach to trust
taxation, complete with false starts and reversals. At the same time the
courts were developing their approaches, deciding specific cases in
decisions that were often inconsistent.
If Congress had not intervened, the courts and the Treasury would
have developed a rational and consistent set of doctrines. Instead,
Congress chose to intervene early in the process. By resolving
unanswered questions, Congress took the power to answer these questions
section 214 [for charitable purposes]), such part of the income of the trust shall be
included in computing the net income of the grantor.
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, § 219(h), 43 Stat. 253, 277.
74. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). In affirming a determination that the provisions
were valid, the Court stated:
But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
command over the property taxed - the actual benefit for which the tax is paid. If a
man directed his bank to pay over income as received to a servant or friend, until further
orders, no one would doubt that he could be taxed upon the amounts so paid.
Id. at 378.
75. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.

THE LAW OF TAXATION

away from the Treasury and, ultimately, from the courts. The Treasury
and the courts no longer had the power to create broad legal doctrines.
Instead, they had to apply the specific rules to factual situations and to
fill in narrow statutory gaps.
In developing the grantor trust rules, Congress apparently thought
that it was simply alleviating confusion, combating abuse and providing
sensible rules for a mundane little area of the law. The legislative history
of the early revenue acts shows that Congress did not view grantor trusts
as a very important part of the tax law. Rather, it was just a little area
that needed a few changes here and there.
C. 1924 to 1940
By 1924 the development of grantor trust rules had undergone a
cycle beginning with a simple statute, subsequent administrative
interpretation and court decisions, and confusion leading to enactment of
a more comprehensive statute. This cycle was to be repeated several
times in the history of grantor trust taxation and hundreds of times
throughout the tax law.
Congress never intended to create an
incomprehensible tax law or to take interpretative power away from the
courts.76 In every repetition of this cycle of legislation, confusion, and
more complex legislation, Congress simply tried to clear up troublesome
little problems. The solutions Congress enacted were invariably rational.
These statutory solutions are only troublesome when viewed as part of
the current massive and intricate Internal Revenue Code.
In the years between 1924 and 1932, other than renumbering §§
219(g) and (h) as §§ 166 and 167," Congress did not change the
grantor trust provisions. However, despite the detail and complexity of
the law, many grantor trust cases were litigated. Only the nature of the
controversies was different because of the specificity of the statute.
Except for the Supreme Court decision in Reinecke v. Smith,7" almost
all of the cases deal with narrow questions of statutory interpretation. 9
76. By the middle of the 1920's, the Congressional committee reports began to refer to the
necessity of simplifying the tax law. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1927); H.R.
Doc. No. 139, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1927); REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITFEE ON INTERNAL
REVENUE TAXATION 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927).
77. Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L No. 562, ch. 852, §§ 167 and 168, 45 Stat. 791, 840.

78. 289 U.S. 172 (1933). This case determined that the grantor trust provisions did not violate
the due process protection of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Cf Lewis v. White, 56 F.2d 390 (D. Mass.
1932) (holding similarly).
79. Stoddard v. Eaton, 22 F.2d 184, 186-187 (D. Conn. 1927). Cf Boynton v. Commissioner,
II B.T.A. 1352 (1928) acq., v11-i C.B. 5 (1928); Chamberlain v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 126

(1930), nonacq., IX-2 C.B. 70 (1930); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 132 (1931),
acq., X-2 C.B. 14 (1931); Catlin v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 834 (1932), acq., XI-2 C.B. 2 (1932).
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By the late 1920's, Congress' preemption of the judicial policy
creation process by enacting specific provisions resulted in the courts
deciding cases on the basis of careful reading of narrow and precise
statutory terms. For example, as discussed below, there were a number
of cases deciding what "beneficiary" meant under specific facts.8"
Congress, not the courts, had decided that grantor powers held in
conjunction with a beneficiary would not require inclusion by the grantor.
That was the big policy decision. The courts were left to implement the
Congressional policy by defining who was a "beneficiary" under specific
circumstances. The courts began to note that their job was to implement
Congressional policies, rather than to create the policies the courts
thought best. 1 The shift of policy-making authority from the judiciary
to the legislature happened so smoothly and logically that no one noticed
or objected.
Although the policy-making role of the courts had been diminished,
their workload did not decline. As the statute expanded, it created more
terms that needed definition. Cases had to be litigated to provide those
definitions.
After passing the Revenue Act of 1924, Congress continued to
amend the tax law regularly, but it did not amend the grantor trust
taxation provisions until 1932.82 However, the Revenue Act of 1928,83
as part of a general reorganization of the tax provisions, renumbered §§
219(g) and (h) as §§ 166 and 167, respectively. 4

The dissent in Boynton contains a thorough description of the history of the law in this area.
Boynton, 11 B.T.A. at 1364-74 (Green, J.dissenting).
Hoff v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 86 (1930), required the grantor of a revocable trust to
include the trust's income in her gross income. The Board of Tax Appeals read Corliss v. Bowers,
281 U.S. 376 (1930), as declaring this result to be the law, even in cases arising before the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1924. Hoff, 20 B.T.A. at 87. But see Steffanson v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A.
979 (1925) (denying loss deduction to trust grantor).
80. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Handly v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1271, 1274 (1934); Holmes v. Commissioner,
27 B.T.A. 660, 666 (1933).
82. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 169. The Revenue Act of 1926
did not change the § 219 grantor trust provisions. Pub. L. No. 20, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9. Congress
enacted this act because the Revenue Act of 1924 was producing too much revenue and Congress
needed to reduce taxes. Governmental fiscal realities have certainly changed since 1926, but
Congress continues to amend the tax law whenever revenue and expenditures do not coincide.
83. Pub. L. No. 562, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791. Congress did not change the grantor trust
provisions when it enacted tax acts in 1929, 1930 and 1931. See Amendment to the Revenue Act
of 1928, Public Resolution No. 23, ch. 2, 46 Stat. 47 (1929); Amendment to the Revenue Acts of
1926 and 1928, Public Resolution No. 88, ch. 495, 46 Stat. 589 (1930); Amendment tothe Revenue
Act of 1926, Public Resolution No. 131, ch. 454, 46 Stat. 1516 (1931).
84. Pub. L. No. 562, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791, 840.
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Sections 166 and 167 required inclusion of trust income in the
grantor's income if the grantor retained rights or powers "either alone or
in conjunction with any person not a beneficiary.""5 Presumably,
Congress believed that since a beneficiary would lose his interest on
modification, it was reasonable to treat the beneficiary as the actual
recipient of the income. However, this requirement implied that a
grantor's retention of rights or powers exercisable only with the
concurrence of a beneficiary did not cause inclusion in the grantor's
income. Taxpayers seized upon this idea and began creating trusts in
which the grantor retained powers exercisable only with the concurrence
of beneficiaries who had contingent or small interests in the trust. These
taxpayers were behaving quite reasonably in trying to use statutory
provisions to shift income to family members while retaining control.
Taxpayers were not abusing the tax law. Rather, they were simply using
its provisions to achieve desirable results.
Predictably, the Bureau of Internal Revenue fought back and
attempted to tax the grantors of these trusts. A number of cases arose
concerning whether a person who shared power with the grantor was a
"beneficiary." 86 These cases also addressed whether a beneficiary who
had a contingent interest was a beneficiary for purposes of §§ 166 and
167.87
By 1928 the tax laws had been amended and changed so often that
congress needed to compile and reorganize the laws into a useable
form. 8 In 1928, only 15 years after the Income Tax Law of 1913, the
tax law had become so complex that a modem tax lawyer would feel
right at home working with it.

85. Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791.
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 56 (Ist Cir. 1932); Bromley v. Commissioner,
66 F.2d 552 (3d Cir. 1933); Jones v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 171 (1932), nonacq., XII-I C.B. 19
(1932); Stetson v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 173 (1932), nonacq., XII-l C.B. 22 (1932); Holmes v.
Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 660 (1933), nonacq., XII-1 C.B. 18 (1933); Prouty v. Commissioner, 30
B.T.A. 1068 (1934); Armstrong v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 1261 (1935).
87. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 56 (1st Cir. 1932); Jones v. Commissioner, 27
B.T.A. 171 (1932); Stetson v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 173 (1932); Prouty v. Commissioner, 30
B.T.A. 1068 (1934); Armstrong v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 1261 (1935).
88. See INTERNAL REVENuE LAWS: COMPILATION OF LAWS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXES IMPOSED BY THE REVENLE ACT OF 1928 AND PRIOR REVENUE ACTS AND IN FORCE JULY 1,
1928 S. Doc. No. 160, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
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The Revenue Act of 193289 amended §§ 166 and 167' to prevent
grantors from avoiding the operation of those sections by retaining
powers in conjunction with beneficiaries who had minor interests in the
trust,9 1 The 1932 amendment was necessary because taxpayers and their

89.
90.

Pub. L. No. 154, ch. 209, 47 Stat 169.
As amended by the Revenue Act of 1932, § 166 read:
Where at any time during the taxable year the power to revest in the grantor title to.
any part of the corpus of the trust is vested (1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not having a
substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or in the income
therefrom, or
(2) in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such
part of the corpus or the income therefrom, then the income of such part of the trust for
such taxable year shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor.
Id. at 221. As amended by the Revenue Act of 1932, § 167 read:
(a) Where any part of the income of a trust (1) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income may be, held or accumulated
for future distribution to the grantor, or
(2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income, be distributed to the grantor,
or
(3) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income may be, applied to the
payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the grantor (except policies
of insurance irrevocably payable for the purposes and in the manner specified in section
23(n), relating to the so-called "charitable contribution" deduction); then such part of the
income of the trust shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor.
(b) As used in this section, the term "in the discretion of the grantor" means "'inthe
discretion of the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not having a
substantial adverse interest in the disposition of the part of the income in question."
Id.
91. The Senate Finance Committee report explains the reasons for the adoption of these
sections. S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong. 1st Sess. 34 (1932). With respect to section 166, the report
states:
Under the present law the income of a trust is taxable to the grantor where, at any time
during the taxable year, the grantor has power to revest in himself title to any part of the
corpus of the trust, either alone or in conjunction with any person not a beneficiary of the
trust. In an attempt to avoid this section, the practice has been adopted by some grantors
of reserving power to revest title to the trust corpus in conjunction with a beneficiary
having a very minor interest or of conferring the power to revest upon a person other than
a beneficiary; in such cases the grantor has substantially the same control as if he alone
had power to revoke the trust. While it is, of course, yet to be established that such
device accomplished its purpose, it is considered expedient to make it clear that in any
of these cases the income shall be taxed to the grantor. The House bill made the grantor
of a trust taxable upon the income of any part of the corpus of the trust, where the power
to revest in the grantor title to such part of the corpus was in the grantor alone or was
in the grantor in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in
the disposition of such part of the corpus. Your committee has extended the scope of this
provision so as to include, as well, the cases where the power to revest title to any part
of the corpus is held, either alone or in conjunction with the grantor, by a person not
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sharp-eyed lawyers had found methods of complying with the letter of the
law while retaining the control they wanted. Congress amended the
statute to eliminate the avoidance of tax liability by dividing control
between the grantor and a compliant beneficiary with a nominal interest.
The legislative history indicates that Congress intervened before the
courts had reached a consensus on the issue.92 Once again, the judicial
decision making process was cut short by early Congressional
intervention. An issue that the courts might have resolved through
normal decision making was instead resolved by an impatient Congress
anxious to stop tax avoidance.
Until 1934, the income of revocable trusts was only included in the
grantor's income if the grantor could exercise the right to revoke in that
particular year. Grantors responded by creating trusts they could revoke
only by giving notice in the previous year.93 The effect of this device

having a substantial adverse interest in such part of the corpus or in the income therefrom.
Id. at 34.
With respect to section 167, the Senate Finance Committee report states:
As in the case of the preceding section, attempted avoidance of the provisions of this
section, relating to the income held or accumulated for the grantor, has rendered expedient
a change in its wording to clock certain recent practices. The present law taxes the
income of a trust to the grantor when in his discretion, either alone or in conjunction with
a person not a beneficiary, the trust income may be held or accumulated for future
distribution to him, or is or may be applied to the payment of premiums upon insurance
policies on the grantor's life. Trusts have been established in which income is held or
accumulated for the grantor, which fact, it is contended, removes such trusts from the
operation of this section. Here again, it is not at all certain that the courts will uphold
such devices yet the statute may well be clarified to remove any doubt that the income
of such trusts is to be taxes [sic] to the grantors. In the House bill, the section has been
amended to provide that there shall be taxed to the grantor of a trust any part of the
income of the trust which (1) is, or in the grantor's discretion may be, held or
accumulated for future distribution to him, or (2) may, in the grantor's discretion be
distributed to him, or (3) is, or in the grantor's discretion, may be applied to the payment
of premiums upon policies of insurance on his life. Your committee has further amended
the section so as to cover, in addition, cases in which the discretion as to the disposition
of the income is in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition
of such income, even though such discretionary power is not shared with the grantor. The
House bill added a subsection defining the term "in the discretion of the grantor," so as
to include within the purview of the section cases in which the discretion is in the grantor
in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition
of the income in question.
Id. at 34-35. Cf H.R. REi?. No. 708, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1932) (concerning the House version
of the Revenue Bill of 1932).
92. See S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong. Ist Sess. 34 (1932); H.R. REP. No. 708, 72nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 25 (1932).
93. See Lewis v. White, 56 F.2d 390 (D. Mass. 1932); Langley v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 796
(2d Cir. 1932); Faber v. United States, I F. Supp. 859 (Ct. Cl. 1932); Ashforth v. Commissioner, 26
B.T.A. 1188 (1932), acq., XII-I C.B. 2 (1932).
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was that the grantor could provide notice on December 31 of a January
1 revocation while still avoiding tax consequences.
Predictably, Congress once again amended the law to eliminate this
device. The Tax Reform Act of 1934"4 eliminated the phrase "during
the taxable year" from § 166. 9'
The planning device that made the amendment necessary arose from
a close reading of the specific provisions of the statute by taxpayers. If
the grantor trust doctrine had been judicial, rather than statutory, the
courts could have easily dealt with this problem. However, since
Congress had preempted this area with a detailed statute, an amendment
was necessary.96
By 1934, the law had become quite specific as Congress moved to
eliminate abuses. Although the law was more restrictive and specific
than it had ever been, the specificity of the statute did not reduce the
number of cases before the courts. Now, however, the cases dealt with
narrow issues of statutory interpretation. 97

94.
95.

Pub. L. No. 216, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680.
Id. at 729. With respect to this amendment, the legislative history states:
Under existing law, the income from a revocable trust is taxable to the grantor only where
such grantor (or a person not having a substantial adverse interest in the trust) has the
power within the taxable year to revest in the grantor title to any part of the corpus of the
trust. Under the terms of some trusts, the power to revoke can not be exercised within
the taxable year, except upon advance notice delivered to the trustee during the preceding
taxable year. If this notice is not given within the preceding taxable year, the courts have
held that the grantor is not required under existing law to include the trust income for the
taxable year in his return. The Senate amendments require the income from trusts of this
type to be reported by the grantor.
H.B. REP. No. 1385, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934).
The Treasury Department did not agree that the elimination of the words "during the taxable
year" would accomplish the desired results and recommended that section 166 be redrafted.
Preliminary Statement of the Treasury Department with Reference to Amendments to Revenue Acts,
100 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF TEE UNITED STATES 1909-1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS, (Bernard D. Reams, ed.) (1979).
96. The grantor trust provisions were not amended in the years following enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1934. None of the tax acts enacted before 1943 changed the grantor trust provisions.
See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 407, ch. 829, 49 Stat. 1014; Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L.
No. 740, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648; Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 377, ch. 815, 50 Stat. 813;
Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447; and Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
Pub. L. No. 1, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 1; Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 656, ch. 419, 54 Stat. 516;
Second Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 801, ch. 757, 54 Stat. 974; Revenue Act of 1941, Pub.
L. No. 250, ch. 412, 55 Stat. 687; Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798.
97. See, e.g., Chandlerv. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941); Morton v. Commissioner,
109 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1940); City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 109 F.2d 191 (7th Cir.
1940); Branch v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1044 (1939), nonacq., 1940-1 C.B. 6, aff'd, 114 F.2d
985 (1st Cir. 1940).
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D. 1940 to 1945
Short-term trusts with the corpus reverting to the grantor caused
problems during the late 1930's. The Treasury wanted Congress to
amend the law in 1934 to tax income from short-term trusts to the
grantors.9 8 However, Congress chose only to tax income from revocable
trusts and not to promulgate specific trust rules for short-term trusts. The
Treasury responded by arguing that a reversionary interest in the grantor
was a "power to revest" the corpus in the grantor under § 166. The
Treasury first took this position in regulations under the 1934 Act, 99 but
abandoned these regulations in 1936.1°0 Eventually, the Treasury ruled
that a grantor need not include the income of a reversionary trust.''
The Board of Tax Appeals also held that a possibility of reverter was not
a "power to revest" that triggered inclusion in the grantor's income under
§ 166.102
With this background, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case
of Helvering v. Clifford."°3 In Clifford, the grantor had named himself
trustee of a trust for his wife, who was to receive all of the trust income
for five years. At the end of five years, the corpus was to revert to the
grantor. The grantor, as trustee, had broad powers to sell, invest and
manage the trust property. The Board of Tax Appeals taxed the grantor
on the income,10 4 but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 5 The
Supreme Court, in turn,
reversed the Court of Appeals, taxing the grantor
10 6
on the trust income.
Clifford taxed the income to the grantor under § 22(a) of the
Revenue Act of 1934.1"7
This section imposed tax on income

98.

STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRErARY OF THE TREASURY REGARDING THE PRELIMINARY

REPORT OF A SUBCOMMITrEE OF THE COMulrTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS RELATIVE TO METHODS

OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE AND EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGETHER

wrrm

SUGGESTIONS FORTHE SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF, 73d Cong., IstSess. 18 (Ways

and Means Comm. Print 1933).
Specifically, the Treasury recommended: "The income from short-term trusts and trusts which
are revocable by the creator at the expiration of a short period after notice by him should be made
taxable to the creator of the trust." Id. Cf Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 340 (1940).
99. Treas. Reg. § 86 (1936).
100. T.D. 4629, XV-1 C.B. 140 (1936).
101. I.T. 3238, XVII-2 C.B. 204 (1936).
102. Downs v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 1129 (1937), acq., 1938-I C.B. 9.
103. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
104. 38 B.T.A. 1532 (1938).
105.
105 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1939).
106. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
107.
Pub. L. No. 216, ch. 277, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 680, 686-687. Section 22(a) includes in gross
income all:
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generally."' 8 In holding that the grantor must pay the tax on the
income, the Court referred to the language of § 22(a) stating:
The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of Congress
to use the full measure of its taxing power within those definable
categories. . . . Hence our construction of the statute should be
consonant with that purpose. Technical considerations, niceties of the
law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which
inventive genius may construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not
obscure the basic issue. That issue is whether the grantor after the
trust has been established may still be treated, under this statutory
scheme as the owner of the corpus.'0 9
The Court concluded that "[tihe short duration of the trust, the fact
that the wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of control over the
corpus by respondent all lead irresistibly to the conclusion that respondent
continued to be the owner . . . ."1" The Court went on to say:
We have at best a temporary reallocation of income within an intimate
family group. Since the income remains in the family and since the
husband retains control over the investment, he has rather complete
assurance that the trust will not effect any substantial change in his
economic position. It is hard to imagine that respondent felt himself
the poorer after this trust had been executed or, if he did, that it had
any rational foundation in fact."'
The Court applied the general ideas of § 22(a), untroubled that
Congress had adopted specific provisions concerning trusts with retained
powers and rights, but had chosen not to legislate concerning short-term
trusts." 2 The Court essentially looked to the general structure of the
tax law and determined that the income should be taxed to the grantor.
Justice Roberts dissented in an opinion that focused on the role of
the Court.1 13 He stated that "[t]he decision of the court disregards the

gains, profits, and income derived ... from professions, vocations, trades, businesses,
commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the
ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends,
securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatever.
Id. at 687.
108. Id. This section was the forerunner of current I.R.C. § 61 (1986).
109. 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
110. Id. at 335.
111. Id. at 335-36.
112. The Court stated that, in view of its conclusions under § 22(a), it did not need to consider
the applicability of § 166 to these facts. Id. at 337.
113. Id. at 338.
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fundamental principle that legislation is not the function of the judiciary
but of Congress."" 4 In his view, the Treasury was asking the Court,
rather than Congress, to amend the statute. Since Congress had not
chosen to tax the grantors of short-term trusts, Justice Roberts believed
that the Court should not impose the tax." 5
There is much common sense in the dissent. Congress had declined
to specifically tax the grantors of short-term trusts while taxing grantors
of other trusts who had retained substantial powers. Therefore, since
Congress had passed up the opportunity to tax these trusts, it was
reasonable to conclude that Congress did not intend to tax them.
Congress, of course, could change its collective mind and tax these
grantors. The dissent urged Congress to pass a specific statute to tax
these grantors." 6 After all, Congress had not hesitated previously to
amend the law several times to tax grantors.
Still, the majority opinion in Clifford is powerful. The Court
demonstrated that it had an important role in creating tax structure and
policy. Even though the tax law had developed into a comprehensive
statute, the Court was willing to forcefully assert its power to shape the
law.
After Clifford the law of grantor trusts was divided into two parts.
First, §§ 166 and 167 provided precise statutory rules concerning
revocable trusts and trusts with income payable to the grantor. Second,
the Clifford doctrine provided that the grantor of a reversionary trust may
be taxed on its income. Any major developments under §§ 166 and 167
had to come from Congress because Congress had taken control of these
areas. On the other hand, development of the Clifford doctrine remained
in the hands of the courts because Congress had not yet chosen to
legislate on those precise issues. It is instructive for us to examine the
effect of the broad, vague standards of the Clifford doctrine and to
compare the effect of the narrow and precise rules of §§ 166 and 167.
Eventually, Congress took the power to form the law away from the
Supreme Court. Even though Clifford showed the Court's willingness to
114.
115.

Clitrord, 309 U.S. at 338.
The dissent stated:
To construe either sec. 166 or sec. 22(a) of the statute as justifying taxation of
income to respondent in this case is in my judgment, to write into the statute what is not
there and what Congress has omitted to place there.
If judges were members of the legislature they might well vote to amend the act so
as to tax such income in order to frustrate avoidance of tax but, as judges, they exercise
a very different function. They ought to read the act to cover nothing more than Congress
has specified.
Clifford. 309 U.S. at 341 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
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assert itself and make law, Congress later amended the Code, turning the
judicial Clifford doctrine into a legislative doctrine." 7 The specific
statutory rules that Congress adopted prevented the courts from
developing new subdoctrines to fill out the Clifford doctrine.
After all the dust died down, the result was not much different than
if the dissent had prevailed in Clifford. If the dissent had prevailed and
the taxpayer had won, Congress would surely have amended the law to
reverse the decision. A taxpayer victory under the dissent's reasoning
would have resulted in immediate, widespread abuse through income
shifting grantor trusts. Congress would have promptly amended the law
with provisions similar to those that it eventually adopted. The only real
consequence of the government's victory in Clifford was that it took
longer for Congress to adopt the necessary amendments.
If the
govemment had lost, the same result would have been reached, only more
quickly.
Helvering v. Wood,'18 a companion case to Clifford, also dealt with
a short-term trust having a reversion to the grantor. In contrast to
Clifford's broad reasoning, Wood looks narrowly to the specific rules of
§ 166." 9 Relying strictly on § 166, the Court held that the grantor
need not include the income from the trust. 20
Read together, Wood and Clifford reveal different approaches to the
tax statute. Clifford shows a willingness to interpret the requirements of

117. See infra notes 175-205 and accompanying text.
118. 309 U.S. 344(1940).
119. The Court refused to apply section 22(a) because the § 22(a) argument had not been made
in the lower court Id. at 348-49.
120. In reaching this decision, the Court stated:
A power to revest or revoke may in economic fact be the equivalent of a reversion. But
at least in the law of estates they are by no means synonymous. For, generally speaking,
the power to revest or to revoke an existing estate is discretionary with the donor, a
reversion is the residue left in the grantor on determination of a particular estate...
Congress seems to have drawn § 166 with that distinction in mind, for mere reversions
are not specifically mentioned. Whether as a matter of policy such nice distinctions
should be perpetuated in a tax law by selecting one type of trust for special treatment but
not the other is not for us. We have only the responsibility of carrying out the
Congressional mandate. And where Congress has drawn a distinction, however nice, it
is not proper for us to obliterate it That seems to be the case here. Whether wisely or
not, Congress confined § 166 to trusts where there was a "power to revest." The problem
of interpretation under § 166 is therefore quite different from that under § 22(a). The
former is narrowly confined to a special class; the latter by broad sweeping language is
all inclusive. Helvering v. Clifford, supra note 106. Accordingly, the wide range for
definition and specification under the latter is lacking under § 166. And so far as § 166
is concerned no apparent or lurking ambiguity requires or permits us to divine a broader
purpose than that expressed.
Id. at 347.
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§ 22(a) broadly to carry out the general purposes of the tax law. Wood,
in contrast, confines itself to the specific requirements of the much
narrower statute. The Court felt itself bound to follow the § 166
requirements even though it apparently thought the provision was too
narrow. 2 1 As Congress continued to codify the law, the courts
increasingly had to decide cases on narrow technical grounds, as the
Supreme Court had done in Wood. The narrow, technical analysis of
Wood is much more typical of the reasoning of tax cases that followed
than is the grand policy analysis of Clifford.
Clifford emphasized three elements: (1) the relatively short term of
the trust, (2) the allocation of income within the family and (3) the
grantor's retention of control over the corpus.' 22 However, it did not
create any bright line rules. Rather, the Court stated:
Our point here is that no one fact is normally decisive but that all
considerations and circumstances of the kind we have mentioned are
relevant to the question of ownership and are appropriate foundations
for findings on that issue. 3
Clifford did not state a rule; it merely stated the considerations that
were to govern future decisions about substantial ownership of trust
income. The decision made litigation of many future cases both
necessary and inevitable 24 in order to fill in the bare outline of the
doctrine. The breadth and vagueness of the decision gave no clear
answers in most situations.

121. The Court stated:
Whether wisely or not, Congress confined § 166 to trusts where there was "a power to
revest". The problem of interpretation under § 166 is therefore quite different from that
under § 22(a). The former is narrowly confined to a special class; the latter by broad,
sweeping language is all inclusive ....
Id. at 347.
122. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1944).
123. 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1940).
124. Clifford decided the specific controversy by considering all of the "considerations and
circumstances." Helvering, 309 U.S. at 331. It provided only broad principles. This, of course, is
typical ofjudicial decisions. They consider everything relevant to decide the case in controversy and
do not create precise rules for future cases. Courts must decide future cases on their unique facts
under the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court. In contrast, the only purpose of a statute is to
provide rules to govern future circumstances with as much precision as possible. Tax statutes tend
to be very precise, with bright lines and sudden death rules. Where a judicial decision would say
"a reasonable time" or "a reasonable amount," a statute will say "30 days" or "20 percent"
This pattern holds in the grantor trust area. Where Congress had occupied the field through
sections 166 and 167, the cases have dealt with narrow questions of interpretation of specific
statutory terms. In contrast, under the judicial doctrine of Clifford, the cases viewing the
"considerations and circumstances" of each case had no clear guidance even for the basic questions.
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Clifford ushered in a golden age of grantor trust litigation. The
Commissioner used the Clifford doctrine to attack many trusts where
factors might support a conclusion of substantial ownership. The flood
of litigation 2 ' provided employment (gainful or otherwise) for lawyers,
judges and government functionaries, but accomplished little else." 6
The later cases focused on the three factors that Clifford
identified - (1) the trust term, (2) family relationship between grantor
and beneficiary and (3) powers retained by the grantor.127 Predictably,
many cases dealt with the duration of the trust.
Because Clifford
involved a five year trust, it was not clear if the grantor was taxable on
trust income from longer-term trusts. Some grantors were taxed on
income from trusts with relatively long durations. 28 For example,
Commissioner v. Jonas, 129 held the grantor not taxable on the income
of a ten year trust, while Commissioner v. Barbour 3 ' and Helvering v.
Elias 3' taxed income to the grantor in trusts that would revert in six

125. There are 213 cases decided between the years 1940 and 1945 that cite Clifford. Despite
their number, these cases did not substantially clarify the law. Judge Learned Hand commented that
the Clifford test was "impalpable enough at best; but if it is to be continually refined by successive
distinctions, each trifling in itself, we shall end in a morass from which there will be no escape."
Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1945).
126. In addition to a flood of litigation, Clifford also produced a flood of literature. See Richard
W. Case, The Circuit Courts ofAppeals Examine the CliffordDoctrine, 7 MD. L. REV. 202 (1943);
Russell Magill, The FederalIncome Tax on the Family, 20 TEX. L. REV. 150 (1941); Erwin N.
Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate and Gift Tax Provisions with Respect
to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1942); James R. Higgins, Note, Recent
Developments in the Taxation of Short-Term Irrevocable Trusts, 30 GEo. L.J. 656 (1942); Abraham
S. Guterman, The FederalIncome Tax and Trustsfor Support - The Stuart Case and Its Aftermath,
57 HARV. L. REV. 479 (1944); George F. James, Family Trusts andFederal Taxes, 9 U. CHI. L.
REV. 427; Russell Magill, What Should Be Done With the Clifford Case?, 45 CoL L. REv. 111
(1945); Emund W. Pavenstedt, The BroadenedScope of Section 22(a): The Evolution of the Clifford
doctrine, 51 YALE L.J. 213 (1941); George E. Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable
Trusts, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1322 (1940); Note, 10 U. CIE. L REV. 488 (1943); Kenneth A. Tiffl,
Note, 27 CORN. L.Q. 133 (1941).
127. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940). See generally Magill, supra note 70.
128. See Rentschler v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 814 (1943) (beneficiary's life); Marshall v.
Commissioner, I T.C. 442 (1943) (beneficiary's life); Jacobs v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 99 (5th Cir.
1942) (settlor's life); White v. Higgins, 116 F.2d 312 (1st Cir. 1940) (settlor's life); Banfield v.
Commissioner, 4 T.C. 29 (1944) (settlor's life), acq., 1944 C.B. 2; Cox v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d
934 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,311 U.S. 667 (1940) (settlor's life); Williamson v. Commissioner,
132 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1942) (lives); Brown v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1942) (settlor's
life); Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1941) (lives); Price v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d
95 (6th Cir. 1942) (17 years); Commissioner v. O'Keeffe, 118 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1941) (15 years);
Commissioner v. Ward, 119 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1941) (10 years); Cory v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d
689 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 642 (1942) (10 years); Commissioner v. Berolzheimer,
116 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1940) (9 and 10 years).
129. 122 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1941).
130. 122 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941).
131. 122 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 692 (1941).
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years. Although many cases were litigated, a consistent rule did not
emerge.
On the other hand, some grantors were not taxed on the income of
relatively short trusts where the beneficiaries were charities.' 32 Other
cases focused on the existence of a reversion. A grantor of a trust who
held no reversion, or a remote one, generally was not taxed on trust
income.' 33
In addition, a number of cases dealt with the effect of the grantor's
retention of powers over the trusts. Some cases concerned a grantor
acting as trustee. Some cases held the grantor not to be taxable, even
though he was a trustee.'34 Other cases dealt with grantors who were
not trustees, but who held managerial powers. 35 Commissioner v.
Berolzheimer136 for example, held that the income of nine and ten-year
trusts was attributable to the grantor. Grantors who retained power to
redistribute income among beneficiaries
or to change beneficiaries were
3
usually taxed on the income. 1

132. Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1941); Helvering v. Bok, 132 F.2d
365 (3d Cir. 1942); United States v. Anderson, 132 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1942), cerl. denied, 318 U.S.
790 (1943).
133. See Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1940); Commissioner v. Betts, 123
F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1941); Suhr v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v.
Katz, 139 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Armour, 125 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1942);
Armstrong v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1944); Jones v. Norris, 122 F.2d 6 (10th Cir.
1941); Morgan v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 510 (1943), acq., 1944 C.B. 20; Weil v. Commissioner, 3
T.C. 579 (1944), acq., 1944 C.B. 29; Price v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. Wilson, 125 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1942); Reuter v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 698 (5th
Cir. 1941); Cox v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 667 (1940);
Hopkins v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 560 (1934).
134. See Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1940); Palmer v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 1002 (1939), nonacq., 1940 C.B. 8, aftd, 115 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1940); Childs v.
Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1191 (1941), acq., 1941-2 C.B. 3; Armstrong v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d
700 (10th Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Katz, 139 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1943); Morgan v.
Commissioner, 2 T.C. 510 (1943); Commissioner v. Armour, 125 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. O'Keeffe, 118 F.2d 639 (lst Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F.2d
765 (2d Cir. 1941); Small v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1142 (1944), acq., 1944 C.B. 25; Weil v.
Commissioner, 3 T.C. 579 (1944), acq., 1944 C.B. 29; Lowenstein v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1133
(1944), acq., 1944 C.B. 18; Cartinhour v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 482 (1944), acq., 1944 C.B. 18;
Whiteley v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1265 (1944), acq., 1944 C.B. 30; White v. Higgins, 116 F.2d 312
(1st Cir. 1940).
135. See United States v. Anderson, 132 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 790
(1943), rehg denied, 319 U.S. 781 (1943); Williamson v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1942).
136. 116 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1940); cf Williamson v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1942), reh g denied, (Feb. 1, 1943). Williamson involved a trust for the beneficiaries' lives with the
grantor being a co-trustee with his wife and attorney. Id. The court held the grantor in Williamson
to be taxable on the trust income. Id.
137. See Hawkins v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1945); Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.2d
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The Supreme Court revisited the general area in 1941 in Harrison
v. Schaffner,"38
' a case involving a trust beneficiary who assigned part
of her trust income interest to her children for a year. Predictably, the
Court held her taxable on the income.' 39 Although the Court was quite
willing to take responsibility for the decision, it also recognized that the
Treasury or Congress could take control. The Court stated:
Unless in the meantime the difficulty be resolved by statute or
treasury regulation, we leave it to future judicial decisions to
determine precisely where the line shall be drawn between gifts of
income-producing property and gifts of income from property of
which the donor remains the owner, for all substantial and practical
purposes. 4 °
The Court did not view itself in conflict with the other branches of
government. Rather, it shouldered the responsibility of decision-making
because the legislative and administrative branches had not chosen to
resolve these issues.
In 1942, the Supreme Court decided Helvering v. Stuart. 4' In
Stuartthe grantor created trusts for his minor children, giving the trustees
power to "pay over to [the beneficiary] so much of the net income from
the Trust Fund, or ...apply so much of said income for his education,
support and maintenance, as to them shall seem advisable, and in such
manner as to them shall seem best. .1. '42 Undistributed income was
to be added to trust corpus.' 43 The Supreme Court considered §§ 22(a),
166 and 167 and held that the grantor was taxable on the income under
§ 167 because the grantor owed a parental obligation to support his
children.
The Board of Tax Appeals decision in Stuart had taxed the donor
only on the amount of income that was actually used for the support of

425 (2d Cir. 1944); Brown v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Buck,
120 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1941).
138. 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
139. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited, in addition to Clifford, Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940); and Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136
(1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
140. 312 U.S. at 583-84; cf.Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942), modified and reh'g
denied, 317 U.S. 602 (1942), reh'g denied, 317 U.S. 711 (1942) (interpreting the interplay of
sections 22(a), 166, and 167).
141. 317 U.S. 154 (1942). The Supreme Court decided this case because there had been
inconsistent lower court decisions. See Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 706 (1941); Fulham v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1940); Whiteley
v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 657 (1941).
142. 317 U.S. 154, 157 (1942).
143. Id.
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the children.' 44 The Supreme Court, however, taxed the entire trust
income to the grantor even though not all of it was used to satisfy the
grantor's support obligation. 4 The Court stated that:
[T]he possibility of the use of the income to relieve the grantor, pro
tanto, of his parental obligation is sufficient to bring the entire income
of these trusts for minors
within the rule of attribution laid down in
6
Douglas v. Willcuts.1

Congress expressed its disapproval of the Stuart decision by adding
new § 167(c) as part of the Revenue Act of 1943.'
Section 167(c)
taxed only amounts actually expended to satisfy support obligations. The
legislative history of this amendment simply states that Congress believed
that "the rule in effect prior to the Stuart case [sic] is the sound rule and
has inserted a provision in the bill to restore the old rule."' 48
The enactment of § 167(c) benefitted taxpayers because it reversed
a government victory in the Supreme Court. Congress enacted this
provision even though the main purpose of the Revenue Act of 1943 was
to increase revenue to pay for World War II.
The legislative history
of the 1943 Revenue Act shows that Congress was aware of the
increasing complexity and lack of structure of the tax law. The House
report states:
The Federal tax system, like Topsy, just "growed" up. One tax law
has been piled on another until we have a veritable hodge-podge
which is steadily becoming more complex and incomprehensible. The
need for a thorough overhauling of our tax system has long been

144. Stuart v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1421 (1940).
145. Id. at 170.
146. Id. at 170-71.
147. Pub. L. No. 235, ch. 63, 58 Stat. 21 (1944). Section 134 of this act adds § 167(c), which
states:
(c) Income of a trust shall not be considered taxable to the grantor under subsection (a)
or any other provision of this chapter merely because such income, in the discretion of
another person, the trustee, or the grantor acting as trustee or cotrustee, may be applied
or distributed for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally
obligated to support or maintain, except to the extent that such income is so applied or
distributed. In cases where the amounts so applied or distributed are paid out of corpus
or out of other than income for the taxable year, such amounts shall be considered paid
out of income to the extent of the income of the trust for such taxable year which is not
paid, credited, or to be distributed under section 162 and which is not otherwise taxable
to the grantor.
Id.at 51.
148. H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1943). Cf'S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong. 1st
Sess. 28 (1943).
149. See H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943); S.REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1943).
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acknowledged but nothing has ever been accomplished along this
line. 5 o
Stuart is notable because it is the last case that the Supreme Court

decided on grantor trust issues.

In the half century since Stuart, the

Supreme Court has not found it necessary to return to the grantor trust
issue. In contrast, these issues produced five Supreme Court decisions in
the 18 years between 1924 and 1942. A probable explanation for the
recent dearth of Supreme Court cases is that Congress and the Treasury,
through statutes and regulations, simply took the policy-making power
away from the courts. Grantor trust taxation became a comprehensive set
of statutory rules and administrative regulations. After the mid-1940's
there were no major policy issues left for the Supreme Court to decide.
E. 1945 to 1954
Clifford had caused a flood of litigation and confusion. The
Treasury tried to bring order to the chaos through regulations, commonly
referred to as the "Clifford regulations."''
These regulations, issued
in late 1945, contained specific rules governing taxation of the grantor on
trust income.'
The Clifford regulations focused on three factors.

First, they dealt with the duration of the trusts. If the trust assets reverted
to the grantor within ten years, the grantor was taxed on trust
income.' 53 The grantor was also taxed if the assets reverted within
fifteen years and the grantor retained specified powers of administration

150. H.R. REP. No. 871, Pt. 2, 78th Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1943).
151. T. D. 5488, 1946-1 C.B. 19. This Treasury Decision created new § 29.22(a)-21 of the
regulations. T.D. 5567, 1946-1 C.B. 19, amending T.D. 5488.
The Supreme Court invited the Treasury to promulgate regulations when it wrote that "[iln
the absence of more precise standards supplied by statute or appropriate regulations ...." it had to
decide the case by analyzing all of the circumstances of the trust's creation and operation. Clifford,
309 U.S. at 334.
152. The introduction to these regulations states the reasons for their adoption:
Income of a trust is taxable to the grantor under section 22(a) although not payable to the
grantor himself and not to be applied in satisfaction of his legal obligations if he has
retained a control of the trust so complete that he is still in practical effect the owner of
its income. (Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331) In the absence of precise guides
supplied by an appropriate regulation, the application of this principle to varying and
diversified factual situations has led to considerable uncertainty and confusion. The
provisions of this section accordingly resolve the present difficulties of application by
defining and specifying those factors which demonstrate the retention by the grantor of
such complete control of the trust that he is taxable on the income therefrom under section
22(a).
Treas. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(a) (as amended by T.D. 5488, 1946-1 C.B. 19).
153. Treas. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(c)(1) (as amended in 1945).
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over the corpus or income.' s4 Second, the regulations focused on the
grantor's power to control beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or
income. '
Finally, the regulations dealt with grantor-retained
administrative control exercisable primarily for the benefit of the
grantor.'56 These regulations differed from the judicial Clifford doctrine
in that they did not depend upon the element of a close family
relationship. The regulations specified the circumstances that necessitated
grantor taxation and identified those that did not, thus providing more
predictability than the standard provided by the Supreme Court in
Clifford.
The regulations differed from the "conditions and circumstances" test
of Clifford because they identified specific factors that led to grantor tax
liability. In contrast, the Clifford doctrine required attention to all
relevant factors. The regulations were detailed, precise and certain;"'
if the grantor had one of the powers or rights specified, he was taxed and
there was no further question.' s With the adoption of the Clifford
regulations, the law of grantor trust taxation shifted from a judicially
created standard to administratively adopted rules.
The thrust of the regulations was to move the basic decision making
process from the patchwork of judicial decisions to the Treasury through
generally applicable regulations. The Treasury was not overtly trying to
reduce judicial power. It was simply trying to provide predictable,
reasonable guidelines. Short-term trusts and trusts with grantor retained
powers were now governed by the new regulations." 9 Revocable trusts

154. Tress. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(cX2). The powers included the power to vote securities, to
control trust investments and the power to reacquire trust corpus by substituting other property. Id.
155. Treas. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(d).
156. Treas. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(e). This section specified powers to deal with trust property for
less than adequate consideration, Tress. Reg. § 29.22(a)-2 l(eX 1); powers to borrow corpus ot income
without adequate security, Tress. Reg. § 29.22(a)-2 I(eX2); fiduciary powers of a person other than
the grantor enabling the grantor to borrow when the loan had not been repaid, Treas. Reg. §
29.22(a)-21(e)(3); and other powers including the powerto vote securities, to direct investments and
power to reacquire trust property by substitution. Tress. Reg. § 29.22(a)-2 1(e)(4).
157. The Cliffordregulations aim to be comprehensive. In contrast to the brief general statement
of principles in Clifford,the regulations occupy six pages of small type in the Cumulative Bulletin.
1946-1 C.B. 19-25.
158. The regulations also taxed persons other than the grantor if the other person had power to
vest income in himself or had powers similar to those that would require the grantor to be taxed.
Tress. Reg. § 29.22(a)-22.
159. The Clifford regulations did not deal with trusts giving a power of disposition to a nonbeneficiary. Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d I (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 781 (1945),
reh g denied, 325 U.S. 892 (1945), held that the trust income was taxable to the non-beneficiary who
could dispose of the trust assets. Currently, I.R.C. § 677 (1986) taxes this income to the grantor.
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and trusts with the income for the benefit of the grantor were governed
by statutory rules." 6
However, in 1953, the Seventh Circuit decision in Commissionerv.
Clark 6' found the Clifford regulations unconstitutional. Clark involved
a charitable trust that the government claimed had only a nine year
duration and was therefore taxable under the Clifford regulations. The
taxpayer attacked the application of the regulations on three grounds:
(1) application of the regulations would give them retroactive effect;
(2) the regulations were void because they were unreasonable and
arbitrary; and (3) the regulations were unconstitutional because they
deprived the taxpayer of property without due process.' 62 The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the taxpayer on all three counts.' 6 3 In particular,
the court held that the regulations created an invalid conclusive
presumption that the grantor is the owner of any income from a trust of
less than ten years.' 64
Clarkis a rare example of a successful constitutional attack on a tax
regulation. Such attacks usually fail because the courts give, Congress

160. In spite of the new regulations, many grantor trust cases continued to be litigated because
controversies arose concerning the limits of the rules in the Code and regulations. See Shapero v.
Commissioner, 165 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948) (reserving power of
administrative control); Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Kanne, 172 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1949) (holding assignor
of trust income not taxable when she has not retained substantial control); Kay v. Commissioner, 178
F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1950) (holding trustee who retains administrative control and exercises it for his
own benefit taxable on trust income); Commissioner v. Goodan, 195 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1952)
(deeming stock dividends received by trust not taxable to grantor); Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d
94 (7th Cir. 1953) (measuring ten year reversionary period from the date of execution of the trust,
not from the date of promulgation of the regulation); Barber v. United States, 251 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.
1958) (rendering grantor's retention of a charge and lien on trust property as income taxable to
grantor); Laganas v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1960) (taxing grantor on trust income
when he held power to create additional trust interests); Holdeen v. United States, 297 F.2d 886 (2d
Cir. 1962) (holding trust income not taxable to grantor who retained only right to furnish investment
advice); Thuet v. Riddell, 104 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (refusing to tax 84 year old grantor who
retained only the right to receive $300 annually from corpus of $5,000 until death or depletion of
the trust).
161. 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
162. Id.at 98.
163. Id.
164. Id.at 100. The court stated:
It thus appears that even Congress would be without power to create the conclusive
presumption which the Treasury has done in the regulations under attack. It is even more
certain that an administrative agency is without authority to promulgate such a regulation.
We conclude it is void because it violates the Constitution and, in any event is in conflict
with the congressional enactment on the subject and is arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at
100. But see Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 52 (1962), rev'don othergrounds, 328
F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964) (refusing to hold the Clifford regulations invalid under the
particular facts in question).
Id.
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and the Treasury latitude in implementing the tax law. Also, so many tax
provisions are arbitrary,16 that if one provision is void because it is
arbitrary and unreasonable, many other provisions would also be void.
Courts do not seem to have the courage to destroy so much of the tax law
merely because it is arbitrary. Ultimately, Clark did not have a large
impact because Congress enacted the grantor trust rules in the 1954 Code
within a year.'66
F. The 1954 Code
The last major step in the development of the grantor trust rules
occurred in 1954 when Congress codified all of the tax law in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Sections 671 through 678 of the 1954
Code' 67 contain the grantor trust provisions.
Congress had now
completely codified the tax law of grantor trusts.
Immediately before the enactment of the 1954 Code, the grantor
trust law was expressed in the statute enacted by Congress and by
regulations promulgated by the Treasury. The role of the courts in
developing the law had already been substantially reduced. By enacting
the 1954 Code, Congress took the power to form the basic law away
from the Treasury. After Congress enacted the 1954 Code, neither the
courts nor the Treasury had a substantial role in developing the basic
doctrines of grantor trust taxation. They were limited to applying the
detailed rules of the statute and filling in the small gaps through
regulations and decisions.
According to the legislative history, Congress intended to codify the
existing regulations, with some modifications." 6 It did not overturn or

165. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)A) (1986) (imposing 50 percent limitation on charitable
contribution deduction); I.R.C. § 1222(3) (1986) (requiring capital asset to be held for more than one
year for it to be long-term); I.R.C. § 2035(d) (1986) (including certain property in gross estate if
transfer occurs within three years of death); I.R.C. § 2037 (1986) (including property in gross estate
if reversion has a value of more than five percent).
166. The Seventh Circuit stated that even Congress did not have the constitutional power to enact
a bright line rule concerning duration of grantor trusts. Clark, 202 F.2d at 100. See Harry J. Rudick,
FederalIncome Taxation, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 243, 249, (discussing the power of Congress to create
a conclusive presumption). In any event, the ten year period was adopted by I.R.C. § 673 and
continued to be the law until Congress changed it in 1986.
167. I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1954).
168. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at 63 (1954).
This report states:
Existing law contains a statutory provision dealing with trusts in which the grantor retains
a power of revocation and also a provision dealing with trusts whose income is
accumulated or used for the benefit of the grantor. In addition, regulations (commonly
known as the Clifford Regulations) provide a series of rules to determine when trust
income is to be taxed to the grantor because of: a reversionary interest within a specified
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reverse the basic principles of the regulations; nor did it express
dissatisfaction with them.'6 9 Instead, it simply stated that these rules
"should be set forth in the statute rather than left to regulations."'07
Congress placed the new rules in eight sections, 671 through
678.1 ' The provisions occupy six dense pages of text. The statute is
intended to be a comprehensive statement of the rules, rather than a
statement of general principles. The present law has essentially the same
rules. They are intended to operate ex ante, not ex post.
Section 67172 stated the general rule that a grantor who is treated
as the owner of the trust must include the trust income and may use
appropriate deductions. Section 671 also specified that the grantor trust
rules govern taxability and that the general taxation rules do not apply to
grantor trusts. 73
Section 6727 contained definitions, including
"adverse party" and "related or subordinate party." This section generally
followed the rules of the Clifford regulations." 5
Section 673176 contained provisions dealing with reversionary
interests.'7 7 It differed from the Clifford regulation provisions because

period; powers to control the beneficial enjoyment; or certain broad administrative powers.
These regulations are based on the assumption that the grantor may be taxed under the
general definition of income. If the grantor retains such elements of control, he is deemed
to be the owner even though the trust is irrevocable.
Your committee believes that the rules for determining when the grantor should be
treated as the substantial owner of the trust should be set forth in the statute rather than
left to regulations. Thus, the bill includes specific provisions to this effect in the estate
and trust chapter. These provisions generally adopt the approach of the regulations (and
the two provisions of existing law) but with important modifications.
Id.
The Senate Finance Committee report on the 1954 Code contains similar discussion. S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1954).
169. The Senate Finance Committee Report states that "in general, the criteria for determining
taxability under the Clifford doctrine follows the pattern of the regulations ....
Id.
170. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1954).
171. I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1954). The provisions and their section numbers have remained
essentially the same since their enactment in 1954.
172. I.R.C. § 671 (1954).
173. Id. The section states that "no items of a trust shall be included in computing the taxable
income and credits of the grantor or another person solely on the grounds of his dominion and
control over the trust under the provisions of section 61 ....
I.R.C. § 671 (1954).
This provision was intended to prevent the application of I.R.C. § 61 (1954), the successor
to I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939), to grantor trusts. The courts (and the I.R.S. in the Clifford regulations) had
applied I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939) in the Clifford doctrine cases before 1954. After 1954 only the new
grantor trust provisions applied. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Seas. 365 (1954).
174. I.R.C. § 672 (1954).
175. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365-66 (1954). This Senate Report states that
these provisions correspond to Treas. Reg. §§ 29.22(a)-21(d) of the Clifford regulations. Id.
176. I.R.C. § 673 (1954).
177. This section corresponds to Treas. Reg. §§ 39.22(a) - 21(c) of the Clifford regulations. See
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Congress adopted a strict ten year rule and not a fifteen year
provision." T Thus, a grantor who had a reversion which was to occur
within ten years of the trust formation was taxed on trust income.'79
Section 673 also had rules dealing with trusts with charitable
beneficiaries' and additional rules dealing with a reversionary interest
taking effect at the beneficiary's death.'
Section 67482 taxed a grantor who had power over the beneficial
enjoyment of the trust. 8 3 However, the section excluded certain other
powers from its operation. 4 Section 675185 taxed grantors who held
certain administrative powers over the trust: powers to "purchase,
exchange, or otherwise deal"'816 with trust assets for less than adequate
consideration, or to borrow without adequate interest or security.'87 It
also taxed grantors who had borrowed income or corpus but did not repay
the loan.'
In addition, it taxed the grantor if any non-fiduciary could
vote securities, control trust fund investment or reacquire trust corpus by
substituting other equivalent value property.'

S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 366 (1954).
178. I.R.C. § 673(a) (1954).
179. This provision led lawyers to form thousands of trusts with a duration of slightly more than
ten years to avoid grantor taxation. The ten year rule was eventually eliminated by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
180. I.R.C. § 673(b) (1954).
181. I.R.C. § 673(c) (1954).
182. I.R.C. § 674 (1954). This section contains provisions that correspond to Treas. Reg.
§ 29.22(a)-21(d) of the Clifford regulations and I.R.C. § 167 (1939). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 367 (1954).
183. I.R.C. § 674(a) (1954).
184. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 674(bXI) (1954) (excluding powers to apply income to support a
dependent, subject to specific rules); I.R.C. § 674(bX2) (1954) (excluding powers to affect beneficial
enjoyment which commences more than ten years ater creation of the trust); I.R.C. § 674(b)(3)
(1954) (excluding powers exercisable only by will); I.I.C. § 674(bX4) (1954) (excluding power to
allocate among charitable beneficiaires); I.R.C. § 674(bX5XI954) (excluding powers to distribute
corpus); I.R.C. § 674(b)(6) (1954) (excluding powers to withhold income temporarily); I.R.C.
§ 674(b)(7) (1954) (excluding powers to withhold income during disability of a beneficiary); I.R.C.
§ 764(b)(8) (1954) (excluding powers to allocate between corpus and income). Section 674 also
contains an exception for powers of independent trustees, I.R.C. § 674(c) (1954), and powers limited
by an ascertainable standard. I.R.C. § 674(d) (1954).
185. I.R.C. § 675 (1954). This section corresponds to Treas. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(e) of the
Clifford regulations. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1954).
186. I.R.C. § 675(1) (1954).
187. I.R.C. § 675(2) (1954).
188. I.R.C. § 675(3) (1954).
189. I.R.C. § 675(4) (1954).
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Section 67690
trust."' However,
exercised ten years
was not taxed until

taxed grantors who retained powers to revoke the
consistent with § 673, if the power could only be
or more after the formation of the trust, the grantor
the expiration of the ten year period.' 92
Section 677113 taxed grantors who might receive trust income.
This section retained the rule of previous law that only income actually
used to satisfy support obligations was taxable to the grantor.' 94
Finally, § 67819' taxed non-grantors because of their powers to
vest trust assets or income in themselves. For example, section 678 was
intended to reach trusts involving grantors who gave their spouses rights
to trust corpus or income while naming their children as
beneficiaries.' 96
The grantor provisions of the 1954 Code were a thorough
codification that created specific, forward looking-rules. They were
logical and consistent with general tax law structure and the history of
these trusts. Given the nature and history of the situations that they
address, these provisions are reasonable.
Because Congress essentially adopted the Clifford regulations, the
grantor trust provisions had little immediate practical effect; the same
basic rules were in effect, but now were part of the statute, not
regulations. Neither the taxpayers nor the government had to change
their behavior in any major way because of these rules.
However, the codification of these rules changed the relationship
among the legislative, judicial and administrative branches. Before 1954,
grantor trust law was comprised partly of statutory rules in §§ 166 and
167'9' and partly regulatory rules in the Clifford regulations. After the
adoption of the 1954 Code, the law was dominated by statutory rules.
From 1954 to the present, the role of the courts and Treasury has been
to enforce the detailed statute.

190. I.R.C. § 676 (1954). This section corresponds to I.R.C. § 166 (1939) of the previous law.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 370 (1954).
191. I.R.C. § 676(a) (1954).
192. I.R.C. § 676(b) (1954).
193. I.R.C. § 677 (1954). This section corresponds to I.R.C. § 167 (1939) of the previous law.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 371 (1954).
194. I.R.C. § 677(b) (1954). This section corresponds to I.R.C. § 167(c) (1939) of the previous
law. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 371 (1954).
195. I.R.C. § 678 (1954). This section is consistent with I.R.C. § 167(c) (1954) of the previous
law. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 371 (1954). This section also applied to people
who previously released or modified a power over corpus or income in a manner that would fall
within I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (1954). I.R.C. § 678(a)(2) (1954).
196. See I.R.C. § 678(a)(2) (1954).
197. I.R.C. §§ 166 and 167 (1939).
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The Treasury asserted the power to make the rules and set the
grantor trust doctrine through the Clifford regulations. When Congress
adopted the 1954 Code, it assumed complete control of grantor trust
taxation, both in broad policy and in detailed application. After the
enactment of the 1954 Code, both the courts and the Treasury were
limited to implementing Congressional policy expressed in detailed rules.
Since 1954 it has not been possible for the Supreme Court to make a
bold and powerful decision as it did in Clifford or for the Treasury to
promulgate forceful regulations such as the Clifford regulations.
G. 1954 to the Present
Congress has amended the grantor trust rules several times since
1954. Other than the elimination of the ten-year rule and other changes
in 1986, the amendments have been narrow and technical. The law has
become stable.
The first statutory change after the 1954 codification came in the
Tax Reform Act of 1969,9' which amended § 677. The House Report
explains this change:
[I]n the case of a trust created by a taxpayer for the benefit of his
spouse, the trust income is to be taxed to the creator of the trust as it
is earned. However, this provision is not to apply where another
provision of the Code requires the wife to include in her gross income
the income from a trust. 1'
The next change in the grantor trust rules came in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976,2" which enacted a new § 679.2"1 Section 679 treats the
transferor of property to a foreign trust as the owner of the trust if the
beneficiaries are United States citizens." It does not apply to transfers
because of death2"3 or transfers where the transferor recognizes
gain.2" 4 The 1976 amendments also provided that § 678 (which taxes
non-grantors in some circumstances) does not apply if § 679 applies to
a grantor or transferor.2 5

198. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
199. H.R. Rep. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 97 (1969).
200. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). Congress amended this section in 1980 to
exempt foreign deferred compensation plans from its operation. Pub. L. No. 96-603, 94 Stat 3503,
3509 (1980).
201. I.R.C. § 679 (1954).
202. I.R.C. § 679(a) (1954).
203. I.R.C. § 679(a)(2)(A) (1954).
204. I.R.C. § 679(a)(2)(B) (1954).
205. I.R.C. § 678(b) (1954).
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Congress enacted § 679 to combat the use of foreign trusts as a tax
avoidance device. It believed that people were abusing the tax system by
establishing trusts in tax haven countries, and that the tax advantages of
these trusts should be eliminated.2"6
The Tax Reform Act of 1986207 enacted the most sweeping
changes in the grantor trust provisions since 1954. The most significant
change was the repeal of the ten-year rule of § 673.2" The old rule
allowed the beneficiary to be taxed on trust income if a reversion could
not occur until more than ten years after the creation of the trust.2°
The new rule treats the grantor as the owner of the trust if the value of
the reversion exceeds five percent of the trust value.21 This eliminates
most of the tax advantage of creating a trust with a reversion to the
grantor. If the value of the possibility of reversion exceeds five percent
of the trust value, the grantor has not shifted the income to the
beneficiary. Therefore, a grantor who retains a reversion with a
substantial value is taxed on trust income.
The elimination of the ten-year rule by the 1986 Act essentially
removed the tax advantages of short-term trusts. 21 1 The 1986 Act, in
effect, taxes grantors as the owners of trusts if they retain any substantial

206. In explaining why the provision was necessary, the House Report stated:
The rules of present law permit U.S. persons to establish foreign trust so that funds can
be accumulated free of U.S. tax. Further, the funds of these foreign trusts are generally
invested in countries which do not tax interest and dividends paid to foreign investors, and
the trusts generally are administered through countries which do not tax such entities.
Thus, these trusts generally pay no income tax anywhere in the world ...
Your
committee believes that allowing this tax-free accumulation of income is inappropriate and
provides an unwarranted advantage to the use of a foreign trust over the use of a domestic
trust.
H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 207-208 (1976). Cf. S. REP. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., Pt. 1 at 216-17 (1976).
207. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
208. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1402, 100 Stat. 2085, 2712 (1986).
209. I.R.C. § 673(a) (1954).
210. Pub. L. 99-514, § 1402, 100 Stat. 2085, 2712 (1986); I.R.C. § 673(a) (1986). The 1986
reform act also made conforming amendments to LR.C. §§ 674(b), 676 and 677 (1954) to reflect the
elimination of the ten year rule. Pub. L No. 99-514, § 1402(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2712 (1986).
211. Even without this provision, the Tax. Reform Act of 1986 substantially reduced the tax
advantages of grantor trusts. The 1986 reform act created only two tax brackets. Taxpayers filing
jointly with income under $29,750 were taxed at a 15 percent rate, while those with more income
were taxed at 28 percent. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2096 (1986); I.R.C. § 1(a)
(1986). Some married joint filers with income exceeding $71,900 had to pay at a marginal rate of
33 percent in order to eliminate the benefit of the 15 percent rate on their first $29,750 of income.
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(a), 100 Stat 2085, 2096 (1986); I.R.C. § l(g) (1986). The effect of these
new rates was to make the tax advantages of short-term trust substantially less than they had been
before the 1986 Act.
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rights or powers. It completes the expansion of grantor taxation that
began seventy years earlier.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also amended § 672 by adding a new
provision, subsection (e).212 This subsection treats the grantor as
holding any power that is held by the grantor's spouse. The purpose of
this rule is to combat the practice of avoiding the grantor trust rules by
having 3the grantor's spouse, rather than the grantor, hold powers or
21
rights.

The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,214
amended §§ 672 and 673. This act amended § 672(e) by providing that
a grantor would be treated as the holder of any interest or power held by
a person who was the grantor's spouse when the power or interest was
created.215 It also provided that the grantor would be treated as the
holder of an interest or power held by a person who became the grantor's
spouse after the creation of the trust. 21 6 The 1988 act also amended
§ 673 by providing a special rule for determining the value of a
reversionary interest 7 and a rule dealing with postponement of the date
specified for reacquisition.21 8

212. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1401, 100 Stat 2085, 2711 (1986). As enacted by the 1986 reform
act, I.R.C. § 672(e) (1986) read:
(e)
GRANTOR TREATED AS HOLDING ANY POWER OR INTEREST OF
GRANTOR'S SPOUSE. - For purposes of this subpart, if a grantor's spouse is living
with the grantor at the time of the creation of any power or interest held by such spouse,
the grantor shall be treated as holding such power or interest.
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1401, 100 Stat 2085, 2711 (1986).
213. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 1248 (Comm. Print 1987).

214. Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988).
215. Id., § 1014(a), at 3359. The Senate Report states:
This bill provides that the grantor will be treated as holding any power or interest that was
held by and individual either (1) who was the grantor's spouse at the time that the power
or interest was created or (2) who became the grantor's spouse at the time that the power
or interest was created ....
S. REP. No. 100-445, 100th Cong. 2d Sess., 361 (1988).
216. Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1014(a), 102 Stat 3342, 3559 (1988). The Senate Report states:
The bill provides that the grantor will be treated as holding any power or interest that was
held by an individual.. . who became the grantor's spouse subsequent to the creation of
that power or interest.
S. RE'. No. 100-445, 100th Cong. 2d Sess., 361 (1988).
Section 1014(a) also made conforming amendments to I.R.C. §§ 674 and 675 (1986).
217. Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1014(b), 102 Stat. 3342, 3559 (1988). The Senate Report explains
this provision:
The bill provides that, in determining whether a reversionary interest has a value in excess
of 5 percent of the trust, it will be assumed that any discretionary powers are exercised
in such a way as to maximize the value of the reversionary interest.
S. REP. No. 100-445, 100th Cong. 2d Sess., 362 (1988).
218. Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1014(d), 102 Stat. 3342, 3559 (1988). The Senate Report explains
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The latest amendment came in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1990.219 The 1990 Act amended § 672 to provide a special rule for
trusts created by a foreign person for a "United States person."22 This
amendment provides that the beneficiary of a trust will be treated as the
grantor if the beneficiary transferred property to a foreign person who
otherwise would have been treated as the owner under the grantor trust
rules.221
This amendment is typical of the history of the grantor trust
provisions. Even though the Act itself was the result of a bitterly fought
political battle, the grantor trust amendment was an unnoticed minor part
of the legislation. It was a simple matter of housekeeping that Congress
passed in a routine fashion while it fought over more important issues.
Despite the codification of the grantor trust rules in 1954, and the
numerous subsequent amendments, there continue to be many litigated
cases and Revenue Rulings. Although the grantor trust provisions reflect
much accumulated experience and an effort to solve problems by
comprehensive legislation, the statute has not eliminated controversy and
confusion. Rather, many unresolved issues remain open for litigation and
rulings.
But while the comprehensive statute did not eliminate
controversy, it did change the nature of the unanswered questions. After
1954, the decisions and rulings deal almost exclusively with narrow
questions of statutory interpretation. All of the major policy questions
had been resolved by Congress.
H. Summary of the Development of GrantorTrust Taxation
This history shows that grantor trust taxation has gone through a
number of stages. As it moved through its various stages, the law shifted
from broad statutory and judicial standards to precise rules. As the law
became codified in precise rules, the power to make important policy
decisions shifted from the courts to the Treasury and finally to Congress.
As a result, grantor trust taxation is now governed by a complex and

this provision:
In addition, the bill reenacts a provision of prior law which provides rules for
postponements of the date of a reversionary interest This provision was deleted by the
Reform Act, but is necessary where the date of the reversionary interest is after the life
of an individual and that date is later postponed.
S. REP. No. 100-445, 100th Cong. 2d Sess., 362 (1988).
219. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). Although this is the mostrecent amendment,
it is surely not the last
220. Id. § 11343, at 1388-472.
221. See Statement of the Managers, H.R. 5835, Oct. 27, 1990.
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precise statute. This history is not unique; it is typical of the
development of most of the tax law.
The first stage of grantor trust taxation ran from the enactment of the
Income Tax Law of 1913 until 1924. The 1913 Act had only a general
statutory provision taxing income.222 Congress inserted a trust tax
provision in 1916, but there still was no specific grantor trust
provision."' In 1924, Congress enacted the first provisions specifically
taxing grantors.224 Between 1913 and 1924, no specific statutes existed,
only broad standards for the courts to apply. The courts and the Treasury
were free to apply their legal reasoning, common sense, and political
instincts with little restraint from the statute.
The second stage began with the Revenue Act of 1924. In 1924
Congress created statutory rules dealing with revocable trusts and trusts
that allowed the grantor to use trust income.22 The courts would have
eventually developed clear standards concerning these problems, but
Congress cut short judicial development, depriving the courts of the
power to define the law. Thereafter, the courts' role was to apply the
Congressional policy reflected in the statute to revocable trusts, not to
develop broad doctrine.
The third stage began with the Clifford decision in 1940 and lasted
until the promulgation of the Clifford regulations in 1945. Between 1940
'
and 1945 many cases used the "all conditions and circumstances"226
standard to decide if a particular grantor should be treated as the owner
under Clifford. Sections 166 and 167 (the new numbers for the old §§
219(g) and (h)) continued to govern questions of revocable trusts and
trusts allowing the grantor to use income.
The fourth stage began in 1945 with the publication of the Clifford
regulations and lasted until the enactment of the 1954 Code. The
Treasury took control of the whole area of Clifford trust tax law with
these regulations. Although the regulations' validity was unclear, 27
they dominated the law. Between 1945 and 1954 the law had two major
parts. One part was governed by Congressionally enacted rules in §§ 166
and 167. The other part was dominated by the Treasury's Clifford
regulations. After the 1945 adoption of the Clifford regulations, the job
of the courts was to apply either the statutory rules or the detailed

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See supra text accompanying notes 44 and 45.
See supra text accompanying notes 53 and 54.
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L No. 176, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, § 219(g) and (h) (1924).
Id.
See Clifford 309 U.S. at 336.
See Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
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regulations to specific facts. Congress could have left the power to
develop the law with the Treasury, but it did not do so.
The fifth and last stage began in 1954 with the complete codification
of the rules. In 1954 Congress considered the entire area of grantor trusts
and legislated specific guidelines for most issues. Although the 1954
Code adopted most of the Cliffordregulation analysis, it reduced the role
of the Treasury in future development. For example, the Treasury in the
Clifford regulations boldly adopted specific time limitations for
reversionary trusts. It believed that it had the authority to create precise
time limits, even though none existed in the statute or in the case law.
When Congress enacted the ten year time limit in § 673 of the 1954
Code, it took away the authority of the Treasury to create or change the
time limits. Thus, under the Clifford doctrine, the courts had the
authority to determine if a trust's duration was long enough to escape
grantor taxation.22 With the adoption of the Clifford regulations, the
Treasury took this authority away from the courts and assumed the power
for itself. As long as the rules were in regulations, the Treasury could
change them. After the rules were incorporated into the statute in 1954,
only Congress could change them. Congress exercised this power in
1986 when it eliminated the ten year rule.
IV. Implications of the Development of the Grantor Trust Taxation
This history of grantor trust taxation is typical of the development
of all of the tax law and teaches us much about our present law. 229 The
development of the grantor trust rules has been logical, sensible and
predictable.23 ° There is no major development in the entire history of
grantor trust taxation that was clearly wrong or ill-advised.2"'

228. See cases -cited supra note 128.
229. Opening the Internal Revenue Code to almost any page will reveal provisions with a history
similar to the grantor trust provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7872 (1986) (interest free loans); I.R.C.
§ 311 (1986) (the General Utilities doctrine); I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055 and 2522 (1986) (the charitable
deduction); I.RC. § 111 (1986) (the tax benefit rule); I.R.C. § 1341 (1986) (the claim of right
doctrine).
I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (1986), replacing I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1986), is a recent example of this
rapidly changing process with respect to estate freezes. See supra note 7.
See Curtis J. Berger, Simple Interest and Complex Tares, 81 COLUM. L. REa. 217 (1981),
(discussing the history of the interest deduction).
230. Grantor trust law was never the major focus of a tax act. Rather, grantor trust amendments
were always buried in tax acts inspired by major events such as world wars and the depression. The
people involved in the development of this law probably viewed their work as a useful but mundane
part of tax law development The questions and the solutions were so obvious that the decision
makers did not seem to worry about them.
231. Even though each development was reasonable, some ofthe developments may be criticized
because they were not the best solution. For example, the 1954 Code's allowance of a reversionary
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Grantor trusts involve a narrow range of issues and facts, so

Congress has had little difficulty in drafting provisions dealing with them.
The problems have been narrow and the solutions fairly obvious. This
history has a sense of inevitability. When Congress decided to tax
income in 1913, any thoughtful analyst would have recognized that the
tax law would eventually have to deal with trust taxation. Once Congress
decided in 1916 to tax beneficiaries on trust income, the problems and the
solutions that developed were predictable. A tax lawyer of 1924, the year
of the first statutory grantor trust provisions, would not be surprised by
today's law.232 It was clear by 1924 that it was useful to shift income
to trust beneficiaries while retaining control of the trust. The devices
used to accomplish this were obvious and the reactions by the courts,
Congress and the Treasury were equally obvious. Given graduated
income tax rates and trust income taxation to beneficiaries, the step-bystep evolution of this law into something like its present form was
inevitable.
This view of the history of the tax law contradicts the pessimistic
views of some commentators. Public choice theorists, for example, view
legislation as a series of contracts or deals between members of Congress
and interested groups. Under this view, legislation frequently provides
private benefit and does not reflect a general intent of the legislature.
The only intent is to provide private benefit in accordance with the deal
that has been struck. 33 Professors Doemberg and McChesney, for
example, view tax legislation as a contract whereby the members of
Congress provide tax benefits in retum for consideration in the form of
campaign funding and perhaps funds for personal use.234 In short, tax
legislation is simply a series of "deals" for private benefit.235

interest after ten years without tax implications for the grantor may have been an unreasonable
benefit to taxpayers. Still, it was consistent with the cases and reasoning up to 1954. While it can
be criticized, it was not irrational.
232. The 1924 lawyer might, however, be surprised that the law is statutory rather than judicial.
233. Prof. Daniel Shaviro uses the experience of tax legislation during the 1980s to criticize
public choice theory. Shaviro, supra note 14. According to Shaviro, public choice analysis
overlooks many important factors influencing legislation, including the roles of symbolism, and the
desire for prestige and power. Id.
234. See Tax Reform and GUcCI GULCH supra, note 5. See also Shaviro, supra note 14.
Grantor trust tax law between 1954 and 1986 may reasonably be viewed as a victory for the
wealthy and powerful. It allowed taxpayers to shift income to lower bracket family members if they
were willing to allow the arrangement to last for at least ten years. The statutory rules were precise
(in contrast to the Clifford doctrine), allowing taxpayers to know with certainty that they qualified
for the benefit Congress essentially killed grantor trusts as a tax benefit in 1986 with the elimination
of the ten year rule.
235. See Tax Reform and GuccI GULCH, supra note 5.
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The fact that the rich and powerful fare better in the tax legislative
process than the poor and the weak is obvious. However, there are many
more forces at work in tax legislation than simply private dealmaking.
An accurate understanding of the process requires recognition of the other
factors that influence the process.236
The history of grantor trust taxation shows that while the enactment
of a detailed statute changed the role of the courts, it did not reduce
controversy and litigation.237 Comprehensive statutory rules do not
necessarily reduce the number of controversies because there is always
an area of uncertainty surrounding any legal term. Any new term in a
statute will clearly apply to some situations and clearly not apply to
others. Inevitably, however, there is an area of uncertainty surrounding
every term. These grey areas lead to controversy. A detailed statute
contains more individual terms and more grey areas to inspire litigation.
As the statute becomes more complex, the decisions become narrower
and less important in developing the law, but do not become fewer.
This shift in roles has also had a dramatic effect on the future
development of the law because Congress resolves legal questions by a
much different process than the courts. For example, Congress is much
more responsive to political changes and less thoughtful than the. courts.
It can act very quickly to solve problems. Judicial doctrine, in contrast,
develops slowly.
Although court decisions serve as precedent, they spring from
individual facts. Judicial standards, such as the Clifford doctrine, develop
slowly as many cases are decided on many different sets of facts.
Legislative rules can be created much more quickly than judicial
standards. They can be orderly and forward-looking, attempting to
regulate an entire area of the tax law. The effect of the shift to
Congressional policy-making is that the law changes quickly as soon as
problems become evident. The stability of the old, slow, development of
common law standards no longer exists.
Congress tends to enact specific rules, making it relatively easy to
determine the tax treatment of particular facts.23 Courts, on the other
hand, tend to balance all of the relevant facts to make a decision.

236. See Livingston, supra, note 59; Kaplow, supra note 1; Shaviro, supra note 14.
237. The elimination of the ten year reversion rule by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 effectively
eliminated the usefulness of grantor trusts as a planning device. Since fewer of them are likely to
be created after the 1986 Act, there should be fewer controversies and less litigation.
238. For example, I.R.C. § 673(a) (1986) provides that whether the grantor should be taxed on
trust income depends on whether the grantor holds a reversion worth more than 5 percent of the
value of trust. Another example is I.R.C. § 672(e)(2) (1986), dealing with the marital status of
legally separated people.
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Clifford represents a typical court decision because it creates an "all
'
considerations and circumstances"239
standard. A court decision such
as Clifford resolves the immediate dispute, but does not necessarily
provide clear guidance about balancing the facts in future cases.
In contrast to court decisions, Congressional enactments look mainly
to the future and can attempt to be comprehensive. The statutes provide
rules to be applied ex ante, not standards to resolve disputes ex post
based on existing facts. Tax statutes provide the clearest possible rules
intended for future use, rather than to resolve a current dispute.
Therefore, in order to be useful in planning and dispute resolution,
Congress creates laws that have clear lines between tax categories.
The Supreme Court decision in Clifford provided an "all
considerations and circumstances"2 4 standard. As part of this standard,
the Court considered the trust duration, but it did not provide a clear and
easily applied rule concerning trust duration.24' In contrast, the Clifford
regulations, and later § 673 of the 1954 Code, adopted rigid time
limits.242 As the grantor trust rules moved toward codification, they
became more rigid and unforgiving.
The adoption of the Clifford regulations and the later grantor trust
statutes took away most of the courts' power to consider fairness and
reasonableness. The courts and the I.R.S. were required to hold the
grantor taxable if the trust duration was shorter than the specified period,
regardless of whether such a conclusion was fair or reasonable. The
statute and regulations required a court to reach a particular conclusion
even if "all considerations and circumstances" would have persuaded the
court to reach a different result. By adopting the Clifford regulations the
Treasury took for itself the power to dictate generic rules. Ideas of
fairness and reasonableness were still relevant, but the Treasury seized the
power from the courts to determine what was fair and reasonable. The
process of applying fairness and reasonableness changed, however,
because the Treasury regulations applied the concepts to all trusts with no
consideration of other individual circumstances.
Since Congress
completely codified the law in 1954, only Congress has had power to
balance competing considerations in an effort to reach reasonable results.
Now we have generic statutory rules that attempt to reach reasonable
results in the largest number of situations. However, their rigidity does

239. Clifford 309 U.S. at 336.
240. Id.
241. See cases cited supra notes 128-39 (concerning trusts of differing durations).
242. I.R.C. § 673 (1986) of the current law rejects the year limits of the 1954 Act by enacting
an equally rigid five percent of valuation rule.

99

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER 1995

not allow a court to reverse an unreasonable result that the statute
mandates. In return for a relatively clear and comprehensive statute, we
have traded the opportunity for courts to consider all of the facts to reach
the best result. We have gained predictability and stability but have lost
the opportunity to achieve just results in individual cases. Where the
facts are close to the dividing line, the statutory tax law may treat
taxpayers differently even though they are in essentially identical
positions.243
V. Capital Gains: Judicial Development of the Law
Although Congress has now incorporated most of the major tax law
doctrines into the Code, there remain a few important areas of the law
that are largely dominated by judicial standards. In these areas Congress
enacted'a broad and vaguely-worded statute many years ago and has
remained content to allow the courts to provide substance to the concepts.
This part of the Article will briefly discuss the treatment of capital assets
to serve as a contrast to the more typical pattern of judicial doctrines
being replaced by statutory rules.
When the courts begin the process of developing doctrine and
resolving interpretative questions, the development of the tax law
sometimes follows the process of the common law, in contrast to the
history of grantor trust taxation described above. Later cases develop a
clear consensus, or a clear split of authority for resolution by the
Supreme Court. The lower courts then fill out the Supreme Court's
interpretation. In this course of development, the statute remains
relatively stable. The courts rationalize the law and resolve difficulties
of interpretation. After enacting the initial statute, Congress is relatively
uninvolved in later developments. Statutory interpretation and resolution
of confusion and conflicts is left to the courts. Most important, the courts
apply the broad policy analysis necessary to make the law function
reasonably and fairly.244

243. For example, a grantor who has a reversion worth 4.9% of the corpus value is not taxed on
trust income, but one who has a reversion worth 5.1% in an otherwise identical is taxed. There may
be very little real difference between the two trusts, but the law requires substantially different tax
treatment. Courts have no flexibility to treat these two grantors similarly.
244. Mr. Justice Cardozo described the common law process of development of the law:
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense ephemeral. What is
good in it endures. What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish. The good remains the
foundation on which new structures will be built. The bad will be rejected and cast off
in the laboratory of the years. Little by little the old doctrine is undermined. Often the
encroachments are so gradual that their significance is at first obscured. Finally we
discover that the contour of the landscape has been changed, that the old maps must be
cast aside, and the ground charted anew.
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The law dealing with capital assets has followed this pattern. The
first modem income tax law allowed taxpayers a deduction for "the
'
necessary expenses actually paid in carrying on any business." 245
However the law limited the business expense deduction by providing
"That no deduction shall be allowed for any amount paid out for new
buildings, permanent improvements or betterments, made to increase the
value of any property or estate ... .""' Although there are now many
subrules that modify the basic concepts, the current versions of these two
basic provisions remain virtually unchanged from the originals.247 The
effect of these two provisions is that capital expenditures may not be
deducted as business expenses.248
In 1925 the Supreme Court addressed the problem of whether
expenditures were deductible business expenses or non-deductible capital
expenditures in Duffy v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey.249 The
Central Railroad Company was the lessee of various railroads under a 999
year lease. In addition, it held thirty year leases on piers. In 1916, it
expended money under both leases to acquire an old pier and to construct
a new one. In rejecting the railroad's claim that the amounts expended
were deductible, the Court stated that the expenditures "were made, not
to keep the properties going, but to create additions to them. They
constituted, not upkeep, but investment; not maintenance or operating
expenses, deductible [as business expenses], but capital, subject to annual
allowances for exhaustion or depreciation ..
The Supreme Court again confronted the issue of whether an
5 a 1933 case. Welch had
expense was capital in Welch v. Helvering,2

BENJAMIN CARDOZO, TliE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921).
245. Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, § 11B, 38 Stat 114, 167(1913). This law also allowed corporations
a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid within the year in the maintenance and
operation of its business and properties, including rentals or other payments required to be made as
a condition of the continued use or possession of property." Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, § 11G(b), 38
Stat. 114, 172 (1913).
246. Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, § IIG(b), 38 Stat 114, 172 (1913).
247. The current business expense provision provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business..." I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986). Current deductions for capital expenditures
are disallowed by the current law: "No deduction shall be allowed for ... [a]ny amount paid out
for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate." I.R.C. § 263(a) (1986). The current law differs from the original law only
because it replaces the original comma between "buildings" and "permanent improvements" with
the words "or for," and by the deletion of the comma after the word "betterments."
248. Although capital expenditures are-not currently deductible, they may be deducted in
subsequent years through depreciation deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (1986).
249. 268 U.S. 55 (1925).
250. Id. at 63.
251. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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been secretary of a business that had become bankrupt. Although he had
no obligation, he repaid some of the debts of the bankrupt business in
order to reestablish his relationships with customers. The Supreme Court
had to determine if these expenditures were "ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred in carrying on any trade or business. 252 The
Commissioner had prevailed in the lower courts by contending that the
payments were not "ordinary" and were non-deductible capital
expenditures for the acquisition of good will. Writing for the majority,
Justice Cardozo held that the expenses were not "ordinary" and therefore
were not deductible, even though they were "appropriate and
helpful. 2 53 In his discussion of this case, Justice Cardozo gave us a
cryptic observation: 'The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of
law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the
answer to the riddle. 2 54
The Welch decision with its "life in all its fullness" language,
indicates that determination of whether an expense is currently deductible
must be made by considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances.
It does not provide specific rules and assumes that courts will decide
future cases by balancing all the relevant information. Welch provided
a standard to be given content later.
The Welch decision and its vague standard of deductibility is unusual
in the history of taxation because it has not been absorbed or reversed by
statutory rules. Typically, Congress has made Supreme Court decisions
such as Welch irrelevant by either reversing them by statute or by
incorporating their reasoning into statutory rules. In either event, as this
Article demonstrated in its discussion of the grantor trust rules, Congress
usually responds to decisions such as Welch by enacting a web of rules.
Although Congress has legislated in a number of special situations, it has
left the basic question of whether expenses are non-deductible capital
investments or currently deductible business expenses to the courts.255
The courts were willing and able to resolve these issues. The
Supreme Court continued to develop the law of capital expenditures in
252. The Court was interpreting the business expense deduction for individuals as then contained
in § 214 of the Revenue Act of 1924. See § 214, 43 Stat. at 269. Congress had previously added
the requirement that deductible expenses for individuals be "ordinary" as well as "necessary." See
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 214(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919).
253. Welch 290 U.S. at 113. The Court, speaking through Justice Cardozo, seemed to confuse
the difference between an expense that was non-deductible because it was capital and one that was
non-deductible because it was a personal expenditure. Nevertheless, the opinion suggests that the
expenses in question were capital and therefore not deductible.
254. Id. at 115.
255. Welch has been cited in hundreds of cases from 1933 to the present. See Commissioner v.
Soliman, _ U.S._, 113 S. Ct. 701, 708, 117 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1993).
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a series of cases arising from a variety of factual situations. In Helvering
v. Winmill,2" 6 the Court upheld a Treasury Regulation requiring
capitalization of brokerage commissions paid in connection with the
purchase of securities.257
In its 1940 decision in Deputy v. du Pont,"8 the Supreme Court
denied deductions for payments made in retum for a transfer of stock.
The transfers were made as part of a complex arrangement intended to
make executives of the du Pont Company shareholders of the corporation.
The Court denied business expense deductions for the payments because
they were not ordinary.2" 9 While specifically declining to decide the
issue, the court implied that the expenditures were capital.26 °
Justice Roberts, joined by Justice McReynolds, dissented in Deputy
v. du Pont.26' They believed that the Court of Appeals decision should
have been affirmed and that the case did not involve issues of law
important enough for the attention of the Supreme Court.262 Justice
Roberts noted that "[t]he function of this court is to resolve conflicts of
'
decision and to settle important principles of law."263
Despite Justice
Roberts' misgivings, Congress allowed the Supreme Court to retain the
power to create standards in the area of capital expenditures.
The Supreme Court decided the companion cases of Woodward v.
Commissioner,264 and United States v. Hilton Hotel Corp.2 61 in 1970.
Woodward dealt with the deductibility of the costs of an appraisal action

256. 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
257. The Supreme Court reaflirmed the holding of Winmill in Spreckels v. Commissioner, 315
U.S. 626 (1942). Spreckels held that commissions paid in connection with the purchase and sale of
securities are capital, unless the taxpayer is a dealer in securities. Id.
258. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
259. The Court also denied interest deductions for the expenditures. Id. at 497-98.
Similarly, in Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943), the Supreme
Court denied business expense deductions for payments made by a parent corporation to cover a
subsidiary's operating deficit The Court in Interstate Transit Lines refused to determine if the
payments were capital. Id at 594.
260. Deputy, 308 U.S. at 498.
261. Id. at 499.
262. Justice Roberts incorrectly believed that the case did not involve important questions and
would not establish important precedent The case became the basic authority for the proposition that
the term "interest" means "compensation for the use or forbearance of money" and has been cited
many times for that proposition. See, e.g., Investors Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d
1328 (9th Cir. 1982). This case is also important because of Justice Frankfurter's statement in his
concurrence that "'carrying on any trade or business' . . . involves holding one's self out to others
as engaged in the selling of goods or services." Id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This concept
remained important until it was rejected in Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
263. Id. at 500.
264. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
265. 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
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in state court in connection with the purchase of minority shares required
by law. Hilton Hotel Corp. dealt with the deductibility of the costs
associated with an appraisal proceeding brought by shareholders who
opposed a merger. Both cases dealt with the deductibility of the costs of
forced purchase of dissenters' stock. In each case, the Court held that the
expenses were part of the cost of acquiring a capital asset, and were
therefore non-deductible capital expenditures.266
Each of these cases involved a very general statutory standard,
contained in § 263.267 These cases required the Court to use basic
policy analysis to reach its conclusions because there was no specific
guidance in the statute. 268 Neither Woodward nor Hilton Hotels cited
or quoted § 263, the controlling statute. The Court, in effect, treated the
non-deductibility of capital expenditures as a general standard, rather than
as a statutory rule.269
In 1971 the Supreme Court again dealt with the problem of capital
expenditure versus deductible expense in Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings and Loan Association.27
The Court denied deductions for
certain payments made by a savings and loan association to the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The Court held that the
payments were capital, because they served "to create or enhance
what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset .... ,271
Less than a year later, the Supreme Court revisited the capital
expense problem in United States v. Mississippi Chemical Corp.2 72 The
issue in this case was whether payments were deductible interest
payments 271 or non-deductible capital expenditures. The taxpayers were
cooperative associations that were members of one of the Banks for
Cooperatives established by Congress.
Members of a Bank for
Cooperatives that borrowed from the bank were required to purchase a
particular type of the bank's stock. The Supreme Court held that the
costs of the stock were capital expenditures because they provided the
opportunity for patronage and surplus dividends to be paid to the

266.
267.
268.
269.
U.S. at
270.
271.
272.
273.

Woodward, 397 U.S. 572; Hilton Hotel, 397 U.S. 580.
I.R.C. § 263 (1954).
I.R.C. § 263(a) (1954).
Woodward, however, did refer to the Treasury Regulations promulgated under § 263. 397
575 (1970).
403 U.S. 345 (1971).
Id. at 354.
405 U.S. 298 (1972).
See I.R.C. § 163 (1954).
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cooperatives 274 and because the security "is of value in more than one
taxable year .... 275
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of capital investments
in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 276 a 1974 case. This case
involved a public utility that constructed and maintained its capital
facilities. The utility owned the vehicles, power equipment and
communications equipment used in construction. It depreciated the
equipment over the equipment's life. The government successfully
argued that the equipment should be depreciated over the longer life of
the constructed capital facilities. This case, therefore, did not deal with
whether the expenditures were capital in nature. Rather, it dealt with the
nature of the capital asset acquired.277
The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court came in Indopco,
27 8 decided in 1992.
Inc. v. Commissioner,
Indopco concerned the
deductibility of expenses incurred as a corporation planned for a friendly
takeover. The Court held that the test for a capital expenditure was not
whether the expenditure created a separate and distinct asset, as Lincoln
Savings and Loan had implied.27 9 According to the Court, expenditures
that create new assets are capital, and other expenditures that do not
create separate assets also may be capital.280 In denying the deductions,
the court focused on the future benefits that resulted from the merger.28
Indopco rejected the standard that it had apparently created in Lincoln
Savings and Loan, but did not articulate a new standard.

274.
275.

Mississippi Chemical, 405 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 310.

276.

418 U.S. 1 (1974).

277.

Justice Douglas' dissent in this case is notable:
This court has, to many, seemed particularly ill-equipped to resolve income tax
disputes between the Commissioner and taxpayers. The reasons are (1)that the field has
become increasingly technical and complicated due to the expansions of the Code and the
proliferation of decisions, and (2) that we seldom see enough of them to develop any

expertise in the area. Indeed, we are called upon mostly to resolve conflicts between the
circuits which more providently should go to the standing committee of the Congress for
resolution.
Id. at 19 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas went on to refer to the case as "picayune" and

to describe the Supreme Court's "leaden-footed pursuit of law and justice in this field." Id.
278.

508 U.S. 79, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 117 L.Ed. 2d 226 (1992).

279. Id. at 81.
280. Id.
281. Indopco is an especially unsatisfactory decision. While not admitting that it did so, the
Court rejected the notion implicit in Lincoln Savings that capital expenditures create -new separate
and distinct assets. Having effectively rejected this test, it provided almost nothing in the way of a
new test, giving. us only some vague comments to the effect that future benefits are relevant.
Indopco will undoubtedly lead to confiusion and the need for the Supreme Court, or Congress, to

clarify matters.
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The Supreme Court has also been called upon to determine whether
the sale of an asset produces capital gain or ordinary income. The sale
of a capital asset produces capital gain; the sale of non-capital assets
produces ordinary income.282 In 1955 the Court decided the landmark
case of Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner.283 The taxpayer
in Corn Productswas a corporation that manufactured products from corn
and invested in com futures in order to assure a steady supply of corn
and to protect against price increases. The Supreme Court decided that
the futures were not capital assets and that the profits on the sale of the
futures, therefore, produced ordinary income.284 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court looked to what it perceived as Congressional intent,
stating that "Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the
everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss
'
rather than capital gain or loss."285
It acknowledged that "[a]dmittedly,
petitioner's corn futures do not come within the literal language of the
'
exclusions set out [in the statute]. 286
The Court's conclusion was not
mandated by a literal reading of the law, but was an interpretation which
the Court thought necessary to carry out the intent of Congress and to
maintain the integrity of the tax system.
However, in 1988 the Court took a dramatically different position
with respect to the definition of capital assets for purposes of gain or loss.
287 the taxpayer was
In Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,
a
diversified holding company that invested in the stock of a bank in order
to provide capital for its activities. It sold the stock at a loss and claimed
an ordinary deduction for the loss, relying on the CornProducts doctrine.
The Court rejected the ordinary loss deduction because the stock did not
fall within any of the specific categories that are excepted from capital
asset treatment.288
The Court in Arkansas Best reconsidered its Corn Products
reasoning and decided that the conclusion in Corn Products was actually
based on the statute. It decided, twenty-eight years after the decision was

282. Before the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, long-term capital gains were taxed
at a substantially lower rate than other income. This fact inspired taxpayers to try to classify as much
of their income as possible as long-term capital gain.
283. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
284. Id. at 52.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 51.
287. 485 U.S. 212 (1986).
288. Id. The definition of capital asset is now contained in I.R.C. § 1221 (1986).
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announced, that the futures in Corn Productswere really inventory and,
therefore, not capital assets.289
The philosophy of the Arkansas Best decision is fundamentally
different from the Corn Productsreasoning. The Court in Corn Products
felt obligated to go beyond the literal words of the statute to create a
standard and to reach what it viewed as a sensible conclusion. In
contrast, the Arkansas Best Court felt obliged to apply the literal wording
of the statute and went so far as to reanalyze the Corn Products facts in
order to squeeze its conclusion from the statute. Corn Products created
a standard; Arkansas Best applies statutory rules.
The history of the capital expenditure decisions shows the Supreme
Court and lower courts doing exactly what courts have traditionally done.
They took the vague standards applicable to capital expenditure and
developed them through a series of cases. The decisions developed the
major themes of the doctrine and applied these themes to resolve
controversies and to develop the necessary sub-themes.
The process has been dynamic. The Court's perceptions and
conclusions changed and it changed the doctrines to correspond to its new
views. This process has continued, as shown by the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Arkansas Best and Indopco, which substantially
change the law. Unless Congress intervenes, the development of the law
of capital expenditures will continue to evolve through this common law
decision-making process of decision.
The common law development of these doctrines is not typical of
the development of the tax law. It is unusual because Congress has left
the power to make major policy decisions with the courts,290 rather than
creating new statutory rules.

289. The provision that excepts inventory from capital asset status is now I.R.C. § 1221(1)
(1986).
290. Even though Congress has left the power to make major policy decisions with the courts,
it has enacted a number of special rules with respect to capitalization of specific types of expenses.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 263(c) (1986) (intangible costs of drilling and development of oil, gas and
geothermal wells); I.R.C. § 263(d) (1986) (expenditures in connection with railroad rolling stock);
I.R.C. § 263(f) (1986) (railroad ties); I.R.C. § 263(g) (1986) (interest and carrying costs of straddles);
I.R.C. § 263(h) (1986) (short sales); I.R.C. § 263(i) (1986) (intangible drilling and development costs
incurred outside of the United States); I.R.C. § 263A (1986) (uniform capitalization rules for
inventory and self-constructed property); I.R.C. §§ 263(a)(1)(A), 616 (1986) (expenditures for
development ofmines or ore deposits); I.R.C. §§ 263(a)(l)(B), 174 (1986) (research and development
expenditures); I.R.C. §§ 263(a)(1)(C), 175 (1986) (soil and water conservation expenditures); I.R.C.
§§ 263(a)(1)(D), 180 (1986) (expenditures of farmers for fertilizer, etc.); I.R.C. §§ 263(a)(I)(E), 190

(1986) (expenditures for removal of barriers to the handicapped); I.R.C. §§ 263(a)(1)(F), 193 (1986)
(expenditures for tertiary injectants); I.R.C. §§ 263(a)(1)(G), 179 (1986) (election to expense
depreciable business assets).
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The question remains, however, why Congress did not choose to
enact specific rules concerning the law of capital assets. The answer to
this question is necessarily speculative. However, it may be simply that
the question of capitalization applies to so many diverse situations that
specific statutory rules could not be devised. Rather than try to state
rules that would apply to the vast number of factual situations, Congress
seems content to let the courts apply a general standard and decide on a
case by case basis.
Prof. Louis Kaplow has provided an economic explanation for the
preference for standards in such situations. Where the law will apply to
a large variety of different contingencies, each of which will arise only
rarely, standards may be preferable because the costs of developing rules
that apply to each contingency will exceed the costs of applying a
standard to each contingency." 1 A look at the Supreme Court cases
discussed in this Article illustrates the diversity of factual situations.
They range from the costs of purchasing a pier in Duffy v. Cent. R.R. Co.
of New Jersey,292 to payment of the debts of a bankrupt business in
Welch v. Helvering,293 to the costs involved in a friendly takeover in
29 4 Additionally, Prof. Kaplow has noted that
Indopco v. Commissioner.
it is difficult to formulate some law as standards.295
Prof. Kaplow's thoughts help explain why the capital expenditure
law has not evolved into detailed rules. The capital expenditure
principles apply to a vast array of situations: they are relevant whenever
any person or business buys anything. Many of these situations are
unique or occur rarely. Realistically, it would be impossible (or at least
impractical) to develop rules for all situations.
Nevertheless, Congress has enacted specific rules for some types of
capital expenditures.296 It is obvious that trying to enact similar rules
for all possible capital expenditures would inordinately costly in
legislative or judicial resources and would probably be impossible.
However, even though Congress has left the broad general standards
of capital gains in place, it has been quite willing to dictate rules in
narrow areas such as intangible drilling CoSts 291 and research and
experimental expenditures.29 8

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Kaplow, supra note 1, at 563.
See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
Kaplow, supra note 1, at 599.
See supra note 290.
I.R.C. § 263(c) (1986).
I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)(B) (1986). See supra note 263 (discussing examples of specific
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VI. The Forces that Form the Tax Law
There are a variety of forces that drive tax law development. The
forces operate in differing combinations and with differing strength
depending on the political and judicial climate.
Grantor trusts represent a narrow problem in the tax law because
they arise in a limited number of forms. Essentially, they arise when a
person creates a trust for a family member with the effect of shifting
income to the beneficiary. These facts allowed Congress to fashion very
specific provisions to solve well identified tax avoidance problems.
Grantor trusts are typical of tax law problems because they are narrow
and lend themselves to narrow statutory solutions. The current statutory
tax law is simply a collection of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of similar
legislative solutions to narrow problems.
In contrast, there are a few areas, such as the questions relating to
capital assets that are so diverse that no specific statutes can be drafted
that will reasonably solve all of the problems that arise. Because it is
difficult to fashion specific rules to apply to the many different factual
situations involving capital assets, Congress has left these questions to the
courts.299

One explanation for the frequent tax law changes is that our modem
income tax law has always been statutory. It sprang into existence in
1913 with no parents or ancestors.3 " Other bodies of law, such as
property, tort and contract law, have a history of centuries of continuous
judicial common law development. Income tax law has no such history.
In contrast to our view of the traditional common law, we have
come to see the tax law as impermanent and changeable. We change it
whenever the political, economic or social climate changes. There never
has been a long-established legal tradition of income taxation to dampen
the urges for Congress to change the tax law. In short, there is no
reverence for the Internal Revenue Code.3"' It is a government tool to
be used as the demands of the moment dictate.

capitalization rules).
299. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 562-63, 582.
300. Of course, there had been previous tax laws. For example, Congress had enacted an income
tax during the Civil War. Act of June 30, (1864), amended by, Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 469
(1865). However, the modem income tax began in 1913 and previous tax laws had little effect on
the development of the new law. Other bodies of tax law such as property taxation and customs
duties also had little impact on the new income tax.
301. None of the great names of legal history are associated with the tax law. Tax law does not
have a Blackstone or a John Marshall in its history. Dan Rostenkowski is simply not in the same
league.
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In addition to having a long history, the common law contains many
of our central social values. Contract law, for example, is driven by the
idea that people should keep their promises. Tort law is driven by the
idea that people should pay for the damage they cause. Tax law, in
contrast, is driven by the less lofty idea that we must somehow raise
enough money to run the government." 2 The central purpose of tax
law is not to defend basic values. Because the tax law does not embody
central societal values, it is less stable than traditional law. Changes to
the tax law, therefore, do not generally threaten any basic societal values
and are relatively easy to enact.
The grantor trust tax law illustrates the lack of basic values typical
of much of the tax law.3" 3 It deals only with the mundane financial
question of who should be taxed on trust income. None of the grantor
trust law revisions touched the basic values of our society. None of them
aroused emotions like those raised by the questions of war and peace,
capital punishment, poverty, race relations, or abortion that Congress and
the courts routinely consider.. We simply do not care as much about trust
taxation as we care about other issues.
A second reason why the tax law has become a comprehensive
statute is that there are powerful groups demanding or resisting change.
The grantor trust tax, like most areas of the tax law, affects many
politically powerful and, frequently, wealthy people. Influential people
and industries exert themselves forcefully and often successfully in
demanding statutory benefits." 4
Although political deal-making
between members of Congress and interest groups is very important in
the development of tax law, it is not the only explanation.0 5

302. In carrying out its function, the tax law, of course, reflects our values. There are provisions
throughout the Code that encourage favored behavior or discourage disfavored behavior. For
example, the charitable deduction sections, I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055 and 2522 (1986), show our affection
for charity in general, especially for religious and educational charities. These sections also show
our regard for children, sports and animals and even our idea that foreign student exchange programs
are a good idea. However, even though our basic and secondary values form much of the tax law,
the basic purpose of the tax law remains the collection of revenue.
303. Even though the tax law is primarily a financial tool to finance the government, social
values are often reflected in the law. For example, I.R.C. § 170 (1986), allows charitable deductions
for contributions to religious, educational, scientific, literary and charitable purposes as well as to

support amateur athletics and to prevent cruelty to children or animals. The law also gives tax
benefits for pollution control costs, I.R.C. § 169 (1986), and child care. I.R.C. § 21 (1986).
304. See JEFFERY BIRNBAUM & ALLEN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCcI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987) (describing the

political maneuvering involved in the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986). Anyone who is
interested in either tax law or politics should read this well-written book.
305. Public choice theorists emphasize deal-making almost to the exclusion of all other
explanations. See Tax Reform and GUcCI GUIac supra note 5. Other scholars point out that the

THE LAW OF TAXATION

The history of the tax law also shows that there is no impetus for
delegation of legislative power to the I.R.S. Delegation may be one of
the devices that members of Congress and interest groups use to produce
private benefits in other areas of the law, but it is not widely used in the
tax law. Congress generally legislates tax law rather than delegating
it. 306

In addition to taxpayers, there is a powerful government agency, the
Treasury Department, which demands or resists change in the tax law.
The Treasury frequently requests Congress to change the law to eliminate
abuse or to clear up confusion. Additionally, it frequently opposes
taxpayer initiatives for lower taxes.
There is a constant tension
between taxpayers and the Treasury resulting in frequent changes to the
law as the political situation changes. Taxpayer groups pull one way and
a powerful government agency pulls the other. Congress is in the middle
with its finger in the air, testing the political wind. It is not surprising
that this results in frequent tax law changes. The elimination of the ten
year trust in the 1986 Reform Act is an example of a change caused by
a shift in the politics of taxation.0 7
A third explanation for the shift from standards to rules is the need
for certainty. People planning their finances need clearly-defined law so
that they can anticipate the tax consequences of their acts. They want
their lawyer to tell them what the tax result will be, not what it might be.
The result is taxpayers asking Congress to clarify confused law."°
Although confusion in the law sometimes benefits aggressive tax
planners, most taxpayers prefer predictability to the possibility of
litigation. 3 °9 Taxpayers are not willing to wait decades for the courts
to develop a judicial consensus. Instead, they ask Congress to resolve the
confusion by statutory rules.

process is more complex than simple deal-making.

See Shaviro, supra, note 14.

The history of

grantor trust taxation supports the conclusions of Shaviro and others who believe that the public
choice explanation is overly simplistic.
306. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory that legislators act to maximize their
chances of re-election. A plausible explanation for the inclination of Congress to legislate rather than
delegate tax law is that the benefit received by members of Congress through tax legislation is greater
than the benefit of delegation.

307. In the 1986 Act, forces pushing Congress toward a broadened tax base, lower rates and
fewer loopholes gained control for the first time. These political forces have always existed in the
tax law, but were usually outweighed by other forces.
308. Taxpayers' concerns are often presented to Congress by the professional associations oftheir
lawyers, accountants, banks and other advisors.
309. Most taxpayers and their representatives recognize that it is usually unwise to become
involved in a tax dispute with the government Even if the taxpayer ultimately wins, tax disputes
are expensive and disruptive. Most taxpayers will choose to avoid disputes if they can, and a clear
statute lets them avoid such controversy.
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The government also wants to clarify confused issues as soon as
possible. The Treasury is always concerned about abuses or provisions
that cost the government money. In addition, the government has limited
resources to enforce the tax law. Specific clear rules allow easier
taxpayer compliance and easier govemmental enforcement. The result of
these basic factors is that the Treasury, as well as taxpayers, consistently
asking Congress for amendments to clarify the law.
The effect of taxpayer and government lobbying is to encourage
statutory amendment whenever uncertainty arises.31° Neither group is
willing to wait years for the courts to sort out conflicting ideas and
develop a stable doctrine. When one of the major tax constituencies calls
for clarification, Congress usually responds.
A fourth reason that the tax law has become so specific is the
necessity of eliminating legislative gaps and taxpayer abuses. Lawyers
read the law very closely in order to take advantage of omissions in
drafting and seize upon ambiguities and oversights to benefit their
clients.311 This is what lawyers are supposed to do for their clients.
Congress, however often changes the law to eliminate the ambiguity or
provide a specific rule eliminating a benefit.312 This necessarily
requires a specifically worded statute. The existence of a capable tax bar
assures that taxpayers will legitimately take advantage of every ambiguity
and grey area. Good lawyers produce sophisticated arguments and
arrangements that require frequent amendments and complex provisions
to eliminate inappropriate results.
In addition to legitimate but aggressive use of the tax law, some
taxpayers abuse the law, forcing Congress to amend the statute. An
amendment designed to eliminate abuse must specify with precision what
activities no longer receive a tax benefit. Necessarily, the amendment
must be precise and specific in order to continue to allow legitimate use
of the statute. In the history of the grantor trust provisions, this process
is illustrated by the amendment to the 1976 reform act dealing with
foreign trusts." 3 The Treasury believed that foreign trusts were abusive
and asked Congress to eliminate the abuses.

310. Taxpayers often agree with the Treasury on the necessity of amendment. They usually
disagree on whether the amendment should increase or decrease the tax burden on affected taxpayers.
311. For example, a close reading of the Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, ch. 852, 45
Stat. 791 (1928), allowed lawyers to reduce their clients' taxes by having the clients share power with
beneficiaries holding minor rights. See supratext accompanying note 91.
312. For example, Congress amended the law in the Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154, ch.
209, 47 Stat. 169, to prevent grantors from avoiding taxation by holding powers in conjunction with
beneficiaries who had minor interests in the trust. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
313. I.R.C. § 679 (1954). See supra note 202 and accompanying text.

THE LAW OF TAXATION

The fifth major force in the tax law is the use of taxation for social
purposes unrelated to revenue. When Congress wants to require or
prohibit activity, it uses the criminal law. When it wants to encourage or
discourage activities, it often uses the tax law.314 Although the purpose
of tax law is mainly to raise revenue, it has often been used to advance
some other worthwhile purpose,315 adding to its specificity and
complexity.
A sixth major force in tax law development is the need to generate
revenue. As the need for revenue changes, Congress changes the tax law.
Thus, Congress changed the tax law in the 1920's when there was an
embarrassing excess of revenue. It also changed the tax law to increase
revenue for both world wars and the depression of the 1930's. The need
for revenue was apparent in the grantor trust tax changes made by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. This Act had the objective of lowering tax
rates by eliminating tax preferences. Congress eliminated the benefits of
the ten year trust to partially make up for the revenue lost to lower rates.
Since it chose to lower rates but still needed to produce the same amount
of income, Congress had to eliminate benefits. It eliminated the ten year
trust benefits as part of the trade-off that was necessary to maintain the
revenue.
The forces that cause change in the tax law almost always point to
the same solution - additional statutory rules. Whatever the problem
that the tax law faces, it is almost always solved by the addition of new
rules. The new statute is almost always more complex than the original
one. The result is that year after year the tax law becomes more detailed,
more complex and more obscure. However much we complain about the
complexity of the Code, the forces that govern the tax law require greater
and greater complexity.
VII. Conclusion
The history of grantor trust taxation provides an explanation for the
complexity of the present tax law and for the shift of power from the
courts to Congress. The history of the grantor trust provisions is typical
of the tax law generally.
Having looked at the history of a typical tax law topic, what does it
tell us? First, the grantor trust history shows that Congress does not
change the law without a reason. Changes are rational responses to

314.

See supra note 304.

315.

See supra note 304.
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specific problems. The situations that caused past changes will continue
to arise, causing confusion and necessitating new amendments.
Smart lawyers will find ways around the intention of the law. The
unscrupulous will abuse the tax system. War and peace will break out.
Our society will change. All of these factors have caused changes in the
law and they will cause changes in the future. In the past, Congress has
responded to controversy by amending the statute. It will continue to do
so. In short, the pressures that made the tax law what it is will continue
to exist and guide future changes.
We cannot realistically expect the tax law to become simpler. We
can expect the law to continue as it has toward a more and more detailed
statute. The Internal Revenue Code has grown steadily and inexorably
from its very beginning" 6 because Congress has taken the policymaking power from the Treasury and the courts. There is no reason to
believe that the future will be any different than the past.
There is constant, well justified criticism of the complexity of the tax
law. This unhappiness alone, however, will not change or simplify the
law. Many forces push the tax law toward more amendments and more
complexity. Unless there is a complete upheaval in our tax system, such
as adoption of a comprehensive value added tax to replace our income
tax, we can expect more of the same.317
The tax law is complex and constantly changing. Much about it is
troubling, but is it unique? This Article has shown a number of
influences which have led to the present structure, all but one of which
exist in other areas of the law. There are many areas of the law which
touch many people, and which involve powerful lobbies and agencies.
Many legal areas need certainty. Many other areas of our law are
becoming intensely codified.
The only factor unique to tax law is that it alone raises the money
necessary to run the government. As revenue needs change because of
war, depression, inflation or the budget deficit, Congress changes the tax
law. However, as this Article has shown, many of the statutory
amendments to the tax law are not driven by revenue needs. With
respect to grantor trusts, revenue generation was an important factor only
in the 1986 Reform Act. All other changes from 1913 to 1986 were not
caused by revenue needs.

316.

It is difficult to avoid comparing the tax law to a cancer, slowly devouring the patient.

317. It is possible that our system will become so unwieldy that it will collapse of its own weight
and a completely new tax system, such as a value added tax, will be adopted. If this were to happen,
no doubt all of the existing forces would act on the new tax system and eventually produce a system
as fully statutory and as complex as our present one.

THE LAW OF TAXAnON

This leaves us with a sobering and disturbing thought. The tax law
may not be unique and peculiar. Tax law may be more complex and
further along in the course of legislative dominance because of the many
forces pushing toward change and complexity, but it may indicate where
all of our law is headed. Much of our law is becoming codified in
minute detail, stripping the courts of their power. The tax law seems to
be a harbinger of things to come.

